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Part One:  Developing Gainsharing Programs 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2002, The Boilermakers Tripartite Alliance Gainsharing Committee received a grant 
from the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service to learn from past gainsharing 
experiences in the energy construction industry and sponsor pilot projects for the current 
testing and development of best practices.  Acting as a joint labor-management alliance of 
the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and industry owners and contractors, the 
Committee enrolled the assistance of Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations to research, conduct pilots, and produce this Gainsharing Handbook.   
 
This Handbook offers an introductory outline of the components of a gainsharing program. 
The overall goal is to help industry partners understand whether and how to implement a 
gainsharing approach that can best match their needs and circumstances.   Toward these 
goals the handbook provides background information together with guidance based on the 
experience of this industry and other construction-related and manufacturing environments.  
Sample worksheets and templates are included to illustrate how to develop the specifics of 
gainsharing in your situation.  Pilot case studies are also presented highlighting lessons 
learned by those who have recently implemented programs in a variety of energy 
construction industry situations.   
 
On the whole, the Handbook is a tool for generating and supporting further 
experimentation and development of gainsharing throughout the industry.  Although the 
guidance and case study examples are all within the context of outage work, it is intended 
that this information will be informative to those considering new construction and project 
work as well.  
 
Why Gainsharing? 
 
The Tripartite Committee believes that gainsharing can be a good all-weather business tool 
to address critical issues of manpower supply as well as to increase the ability of union 
contractors to compete with the non-union sector.  In periods of labor shortage, well 
implemented gainsharing can serve to attract and retain tradesmen within our industry by 
increasing both earnings and job satisfaction.   The need for attending to the latter point is 
supported by recent research indicating that younger workers are motivated less by 
company or industry loyalty and more by earnings, personal skill and career enhancement, 
and work that is satisfying.   
 
Gainsharing, done right, can address all of the above factors while helping to attract and 
retain manpower when labor needs are critical.  Conversely, when business is slow and 
manpower is in oversupply, gainsharing (or in that case, “painsharing”) might be employed 
to win work from the non-union sector.  Although the research and limited pilot activities 
represented by this handbook are not conclusive, indications are positive that given the 
right job circumstances and relationships among primary players, gainsharing can be an 
effective business tool.
Gainsharing can be implemented either as a three-way agreement between a client, 
contractor, and local union (s), or as a two-way partnership between a contractor and local 
union(s).  In either situation, the parties must be willing to enter into an extra-contractual 
agreement to work together differently in order to achieve superior performance (gain) and 
then to distribute the consequent financial rewards (sharing).  These agreements remain 
supplemental to the collective bargaining agreements already in effect, and as such provide 
opportunities for site specific tailoring to unique needs and circumstances.  
 
The ideas behind gainsharing are not new to the energy construction industry, where 
contingent reward has always been a factor.  On hard money jobs, a contractor that 
performs well earns more money.  Extending the concept a bit further and coupling it to 
the notion of partnering, some contractors have entered into agreements with customers to 
share the fruits of performance exceeding a negotiated standard. Adding tradesmen to the 
formula has proven to motivate all three parties to even further improve project 
performance.   
 
The motivations of the players may vary.  Contractors may see gainsharing as a means by 
which they might attract to their jobs, veteran (returning) tradesmen or even sufficient 
numbers of tradesmen in a tight labor market.  Having thus optimized the staffing of their 
projects, contractors might also view gainsharing as an opportunity to energize the efforts 
of all employees working their jobs.  Trade unionists might anticipate a working 
environment which permits members to demonstrate their knowledge of what it takes to 
get a job done right.  Clients might hope for an organizational climate more conducive to 
on-budget, on-schedule completion.  In all cases, performance improvement is equated to 
more cash, which is subsequently shared among the two or three partners in the 
gainsharing effort. 
 
Constructing the Formula for SHARING 
 
There are two sides to the GAIN + SHARING equation.  Successful program 
implementation requires attention to both.  In other words, you can put an excellent 
distribution formula in place, but if you don’t operate on the job any better than you 
normally would, you may not generate much of anything to share.   The sharing formula is 
not magic.  It doesn’t produce the gain; it only serves to distribute it.  Nevertheless, we will 
address first the topic of formula construction and related program structural issues and 
follow later with discussion of management style and employee involvement structures 
that serve to create performance improvement. 
 
Establishing the Baseline 
 
Central to the notion of gainsharing is the concept of “par”.  There must be established 
some standard or baseline from which above average performance can be measured and 
rewarded.  The contractual basis of our industry, on the one hand, lends itself well to 
gainsharing in that performance measure baselines may be readily provided, or built-in 
(i.e., man-hour budgets, schedule requirements, etc.).  By contrast, in manufacturing and 
service sector gainsharing, the parties must undertake a special purpose analysis of 
historical data to determine such baselines.   
   4
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The contractual basis of our industry also presents us with a limitation, that being the 
inherent imprecision, or “fuzziness” of the estimate.  While estimators do employ 
historical data in the preparation of a bid,  that data is likely gleaned from projects 
undertaken for different clients, employing different craftsmen, working on different 
equipment, under different internal and external environmental conditions (i.e., presence of 
other subs, weather, etc.).  The more divergent from the norm a project appears to an 
estimator the more likely that they will employ a qualitative risk factor or percentage 
multiplier in establishing the numbers.  So too might those derivative figures be adjusted 
yet further to reflect the contractor’s eagerness to get the job and their appraisal of how 
hungry the competition might be. 
 
The consequent fuzziness of contractual baseline figures does not present a problem for 
clients and contractors.  Clients are reconciled to this fuzziness by their own estimates and 
analyses and by reliance on market forces through competitive bidding.  Contractors are 
reconciled to the imprecision by their confidence in their own numbers and by the leveling 
effect of multiple projects. In short, both parties are reconciled to the fuzziness of the 
baseline because it is of their own doing.  
 
But if craftsmen are to be part of contingency reward, how are they, as represented by their 
union, to be reconciled to contractual baselines?   Somehow, they must be convinced that 
the man-hour budget or schedule constitutes a close approximation of “normal” or 
historical performance.  A particularly lean aggressive bid or “loss leader” would present a 
poor baseline as superior performance will not be adequately rewarded.  Similarly, though 
not problematic in terms of craftsmen enthusiasm, a “fat” bid would also serve ill as a 
baseline in that average or even below average performance would trigger a gainsharing 
payout.  In this latter case, the contractor would likely not be inclined to offer gainsharing. 
 
There are at least two possible solutions to this dilemma.  One addresses the manner in 
which the union may become reconciled to the contractual baselines; the other sidesteps 
this particular issue entirely by employing derivative baselines that are extra-contractual.  
We call these two solutions respectively the Project Bid Model and the Project Goal 
Model.   
 
The Project Bid Model 
 
The Bid Model constitutes an extension or extrapolation of the bases of the contractor-
client contract.  In this model, the union must be satisfied that the bases of the bid (man-
hours, schedule, etc.) are realistic and present the craftsmen with reasonable targets (or 
hurdles); in other words, the bar has not been set too high.  This could be accomplished by 
the union being party to the preparation of bids or negotiation of time and material (T&M) 
contracts.  However, that is unlikely as a matter of course, especially in the instance of 
competitive bids, given the contractors’ concern for confidentiality and the workload this 
would put on union agents.  Rather, a practice can be used in which a contractor, desiring 
of entering into a gainsharing arrangement with its craftsmen on a specific project, would 
invite the union to sit down with the contractor and review the successful bid (or T&M 
contract) in hand.   
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In this scenario, the contractor and his/her estimators, should be willing and prepared to 
answer questions the union might have regarding the suitability of the contractual man-
hours and schedules for gainsharing purposes.  How deep this discussion goes will depend 
upon many factors, not the least of which will be the level of trust between the two parties.   
In those instances in which trust levels do not permit the sharing of sufficient information 
for the union to make an informed decision whether or not to participate, and/or lack of 
experience with bid construction prevents the local union official from making such an 
informed decision, additional technical assistance should be sought. 
 
The Project Bid Model may well serve for gainsharing purposes when: 
 
1. The contractor is confident that the bid constitutes a fairly close approximation of 
realistic requirements,  
2. The contractor is comfortable with being fairly transparent with the local union 
officer (or a regional/national official) regarding the basis of bid preparation, and/or 
3. The union agent (local, regional, or national) is able to judge the extent to which 
the bid approximates realistic requirements, reflecting either that individual’s 
experience and/or the good quality of information exchange with the contractor. 
 
Conversely, the Project Bid Model would not serve well when: 
 
1. The contractor knows the bid/contract figures to be either significantly lean or fat,  
2. The contractor is not comfortable discussing the bases of bid preparation with the 
 union (at any level), and/or 
3. The union agent (at any level) is unable to judge the extent to which the bid 
approximates realistic requirements, reflecting either that individual’s inexperience 
and/or the poor quality of information exchange with the contractor. 
 
The Project Goal Model 
 
The Goal Model is different.  In this case, the gainsharing pool (or payout) is not entirely 
or at all funded directly from monies received from beating the project bid figures, but 
rather is at least partially budgeted separately by the contractor and/or client.  For example, 
a contractor might anticipate that improvement in customer satisfaction will improve 
chances for follow-on contracts with this client and improve the company’s reputation with 
clients generally.  Improvement in OSHA reportables will translate into a better experience 
record that over time will result in smaller insurance premiums.  The opportunity for 
greater earnings will increase the reliability of adequate and experienced labor pools for 
future outages. Although improvement in these variables does not immediately translate 
into more profit on this particular job, it will improve the contractor’s financial position 
over time, and for this reason they are willing to front the gainsharing pool.  As for the 
client, participation in the funding of a gainsharing pool is motivated by a desire to achieve 
levels of project results (safety, quality, schedule attainment, etc.) beyond that specified in 
the basic contract. 
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The Goal Model presents opportunities for selection of a wider range of performance 
measures than those specified in the project contract.  How many measures to be tracked, 
the baselines from which performance will be gauged, and the monetary value of 
performance improvement for each measure are matters for negotiation between the  
contractor and the union.  This model does not generally require the contractor to be 
transparent with regard to the project bid and as a principal party to the negotiation of these 
derivate measures, the union is thereby reconciled to the appropriateness of the formula. 
 
The Project Goal Model is recommended when: 
 
1. The Bid Model is not a good fit (see specifics above), and/or 
2. The parties may benefit substantially from working off measures that are not 
directly specified in the (owner-contractor) project contract. 
 
The Project Goal Model is not recommended when: 
 
1. The contractor and/or client are unwilling to fund a gainsharing pool which may be 
only partly recovered by immediate returns on the project at hand. 
 
Program Design Elements  
 
Whether employing the Project Bid Model or Project Goal Model, or a hybrid of the two, 
there are a number of design elements that will come into play.  These are: 
 
A. Measures – In which areas of performance do we wish to concentrate? 
B. Baselines – How will we gauge extent of improvement? 
C. Conversion – How will we translate improvement into $? 
D. Participation – How will we divide up the $? 
1.   Disqualifiers – Shall we have minimum standards for participation and 
performance? 
2.   Payout Frequency – How often will we divide and share the $? 
3.   Holdback – How will we deal with erratic performance? 
E. Administration – How will we manage this process? 
F.   Dispute Resolution – How will we address disputes about performance issues? 
 
A. Measures 
 
It’s important to identify those areas in which the partners anticipate the greatest gains 
might be realized.  Is it beating the schedule?  How about beating the man-hour budget?  
Or is safety improvement a principal concern?  You’re not limited to one measure of 
performance. Multiple measures may be just what you need, however they do add to your 
administrative costs (tracking) and there is something to be said for simplicity.  That 
having been said, Project Bid Gainsharing is often a single measure approach (man-hours), 
whereas Project Goal Gainsharing lends itself well to multiple measure tracking 
(productivity, quality, material costs, tool expense, schedule performance, customer 
satisfaction, safety, etc.).  In any case, it is important to select only those measures over 
which the craftsmen have significant influence or control, can be tracked without too much 
administrative cost, and are verifiable.  Additionally, selecting more than a half dozen is 
not recommended because it creates too much complexity.  
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One particular performance measure must be used with caution, and that is “safety”.  
Group incentives such as gainsharing create social pressure to achieve targeted goals.  
That’s a good thing, and group pressure to work safely is a really good thing.  However, if 
that same pressure results in unreported injuries, it’s not good.  One option in this regard is 
not to include safety as one of your group incentive (gainsharing) performance measures.  
Instead, if you wish to incent safety performance at all, do so in a more conventional safety 
program fashion totally separate from and parallel to your gainsharing program.   
 
You also have other options for incorporating safety as a measure. One is to employ it only 
in a field of several other measures, and then to weight it (by comparison to the other 
measures) rather low.  Another way to factor safety into gainsharing is to make it an 
individual disqualifier, rather than a group incentive.  More information on this is provided 
later in our discussion of disqualifiers. 
 
B. Baseline / Standard  
 
Once you’ve decided on where to look for gain (performance measures), you need to 
establish a baseline or standard from which to measure improvement.  Once again you are 
presented with a number of choices.  A few examples will illustrate.  If you’ve decided to 
measure direct labor productivity, the baseline could be the man-hours estimated in the 
successful bid.  In a T&M project, the man-hour baseline could be that negotiated between 
client and contractor.  Performance to schedule could be measured against the standard of 
contractual milestones or deadlines.  Safety improvement could be based on historical rates 
of OSHA reportable accidents.  Quality can be indexed to specifics such as number of X-
rayed welds either passed or rejected. 
 
C. Converting Performance Improvement Into Dollars  (The Gainsharing Pool) 
 
The pool of funds from which the parties will be rewarded for above-standard performance 
is created in two ways.  In the Project Bid Model, the pool is generated directly by 
contractually specified client payments exceeding contractor’s actual costs (i.e., number of 
man-hours saved x hourly bid rate = gainsharing pool).  In the Project Goal Model, the 
pool is funded separately from contractor and/or client reserves.  As mentioned previously, 
these parties are incentivized to provide such a pool based on anticipated improvements in 
matters such as customer satisfaction, reduced insurance premiums, and stability in future 
labor force availability.  
 
D. Participation – Distribution of the Pool 
 
The allocation of reward among the parties (client, contractor, and craftsmen) is negotiated 
as a function of comparative risk and contribution to success.  On a competitive bid job, 
there may be no client participation at all, the allocation of gain simply a matter of 
distribution between contractor and craftsmen. The theory behind this is that the client has 
received its best price and that risk and contribution rest solely with contractor and 
craftsmen.  
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It can also happen that the contractor and union believe that enlisting the client’s 
participation in the job, beyond the usual enforcement of client’s contractual rights, may 
significantly contribute to efficiencies.  However, in this case the lion’s share of the 
allocation would generally still fall to contractor-craftsmen distribution given that 
contractors and owners are free to establish separate performance incentives and build 
these into their contractual obligations independently.  
 
It is important that the contractor’s salaried employees be part of the distribution, either 
through the contractor’s share, or as part of the “workers” allocation should the 
contractor’s share be reserved solely for risk capital.  Gainsharing is a group incentive and 
therefore it makes sense to include every party and individual who can contribute to, or 
block, the attainment of that goal.  Allocation among craftsmen is apportioned by gross 
pay or hours worked. 
 
1.    Disqualifiers:  In order to promote equitable distribution or to further the interests of 
the various parties, provisions may be made for exclusion of payment to parties or 
individuals under specified circumstances.  For example, a quality clause may 
preclude gainsharing payment from client to contractor if workmanship defects 
become apparent within a specified period of time.  In turn, contractors may limit 
distribution to craftsmen who, during their work on the project, do not meet certain 
criteria such as termination for cause, safety, attendance, quits, etc.   
 
  The role of disqualifiers in a gainsharing program is to provide balance; individual 
vs. group and carrot vs. stick.  For example, if you want to factor safety into your 
gainsharing program but are concerned about peer pressure to under-report 
accidents if you make it a group performance measure, consider making it an 
individual disqualifying measure instead.   Whereas group performance measures 
serve as carrots, an individual disqualifying measure serves as the stick. 
 
 2.    Payout Frequency:  There are two opposing theories in this regard.  One suggests that 
the payout should be as frequent as possible in order to keep participants interested.  
The other theory suggests less frequent payout of larger sums also in order to keep 
participants interested, in this case by the larger size of the reward.   There is no 
science to guide us here, only the experience of manufacturing and service sector 
gainsharing that suggests that either approach can work.  If you elect for less 
frequent, larger payouts, you should nevertheless provide for frequent 
communication of progress reports in order to sustain interest.   The outside limit of 
payout frequency would be the duration of the project.   
 
 3.    Holdback:  If the design incorporates multiple payouts, rather than a single end-of-
job distribution, a holdback reserve might be employed in which a percentage of 
the gain pool is held back for later (or final) disbursement.  This provision may 
serve two purposes.  It could smooth out an otherwise erratic series of distributions 
(big reward one month, no reward the next), and it can be designated to roll back to 
the contractor if a loss is experienced later in the project – a bogey. 
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E. Oversight and Administration 
 
As you no doubt recognize, all of the above entails some additional work.  The objective  
is to offer guidance that will minimize the burden and normalize the process of adding 
gainsharing to construction and maintenance projects in our industry.  Therefore it is 
suggested that you be guided by the dictum that “less is more;” less bureaucracy, less 
paperwork, less meetings, etc.  This inclination is balanced by recognition that there are very 
real needs for structures, systems, training, and communication to enable a collaborative 
effort like gainsharing to work.  Remember, the formula by itself may not be sufficient. 
 
An oversight group can be useful in determining the overall framework for gainsharing, or 
the design of the plan. The composition of such an oversight group (as small as two) and 
the sequence of their engagement will depend upon the scope of the anticipated 
gainsharing plan.  For example, on a T&M project, the initial discussions may be between 
client and contractor, with the union brought in soon thereafter.  In a competitive bid 
project, the client may or may not be involved at all.  Arrangements for consulting and/or 
training in support of gainsharing would be the responsibility of this oversight group.   
 
Once the project is underway and the gainsharing plan in effect, somebody has to keep 
track of the numbers, communicate these results, and issue gainsharing checks.  Similarly, 
somebody would need to take primary responsibility for soliciting work improvement 
ideas and implementing the results.  In both cases, this responsibility falls mainly to the 
contractor.  Should there be a need to make some adjustment to the plan once underway, 
the oversight group would perform this function. 
 
F. Dispute Resolution 
 
Gainsharing programs are established as extra-contractual agreements, outside of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  If it appears beneficial to establish means for explicitly 
resolving discrepancies in interpretation of performance on gainshare measures, then such 
language can be added to the gainshare agreement.  Normally these procedures would 
include a process whereby all sides of the dispute could be aired and authority for 
resolution would be vested in either one or more of the parties.  
 
PAINsharing 
 
Most of the preceding discussion has been directed toward gainsharing applications in a 
stable or growing market in which contingent rewards are above and beyond the 
established or contractual labor rates.  In market downturns a variation on the gainsharing 
theme may be employed to win work that might otherwise be lost to non-union contractors.  
The mechanics of a painsharing project are essentially the same as those previously 
described with one significant difference.  The union permits the contractor to bid a job at 
a labor rate less than the current standard, and 100% of subsequent gains return to the 
bargaining unit workforce until they are made whole (recoup wage concession).  Any gains 
beyond that break-even point are then shared as in a normal gainshare plan.  
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Post-Gainsharing:  Setting and Meeting Expectations 
 
Gainsharing experience may alter the post-gainsharing expectations of the parties.  Clients 
may be looking for continued standard-breaking contractor performance, contractors may 
be counting on sustained above-average bargaining unit performance, and craft members 
may have grown accustomed to participative management styles.  Some of these 
expectations may be at least partially met through successful innovations incorporated into 
future jobs, even beyond those of the innovating contractor.  Improved work habits may 
also carry over to some extent, as might elements of participative management.  Although 
elevated expectations might be perceived by trade unionists as a threat, the collective 
bargaining process will continue to provide protection in this regard.  Complete transfer of 
gainsharing experience to non or post-gainsharing projects is not realistic, but should not 
present a problem since our industry has long factored in the implications of a different 
workforce, supervision, and incentive arrangements.  
 
As to the implications for follow-on gainsharing projects, a concern might be that 
improvements achieved in the previous gainsharing effort might be considered the new 
norm or standard for the next, thus raising the bar ever higher producing more stress and 
less reward in each application.  Not to worry.  On Project Bid Model gainsharing jobs, 
most contractors will generally realize they should not bank on a complete repeat of 
previous experience, but will likely build only a portion of that experience into their bid.  If 
this is not the case, the union review and sign-off procedure will allow for continued 
negotiation or result in a no-go decision on the part of the union.  On Project Goal Model 
gainsharing jobs, the negotiation of the targets, stretch targets, and reward levels 
constitutes a built-in system of checks and balances, allowing some degree of continuous 
improvement without short-circuiting the incentive itself. 
 
Sample Gainsharing Plans 
 
The preceding discussion should be viewed as an introductory sketch of the basic concepts, 
components, and known best practices behind gainsharing.  Every project requires the 
creation of a plan that addresses the specific circumstances of that project. Such a plan, or 
blueprint, must be designed through full consideration of the finished product’s goals, 
technical requirements, and applications within each specific situation.   
 
Since the requirements of energy construction industry clients are far from uniform, there 
is no “Off-the-Shelf Energy Construction Industry Gainsharing Plan.”  However, to 
establish a foundation from which you and your partners can respond to your unique 
circumstances and innovate on specific aspects, the two following archetypical plans are 
offered for guidance.  
 
Archetype Plan “A”  The Project BID Model 
 
Having won a competitive bid job for new construction, the contractor approaches the 
union offering to share any savings in man-hours to complete the work. 
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Sample BID Plan Components 
 
Type of Contract:   Competitive bid (hard money job)  
Initiating Party:   Contractor 
Partnering Parties:   Contractor and Local union 
 
Performance Measure:  Single Factor - Labor Productivity  (man hours) 
Baseline / Standard:  Bid Man Hours 
$ Pool:    Bid Hours Minus Actual Hours x Hourly Bid Rate 
Participation / Distribution: To Be Negotiated 
Contractor Distribution:  Contractor Discretion 
Craftsmen Distribution:  Proportional to All Hours Worked 
Craftsmen Disqualifiers:  Must Complete Project (no quit) 
Payout Frequency:  End of Project / No Holdback 
 
Improvement Idea Generation: Suggestion System 
Communication:   Weekly Crew Meeting 
Oversight:    Contractor & Business Agent 
Craft Orientation:   Contractor & Business Agent  
Administration:   Contractor 
 
As stated above, this plan is initiated by the contractor recognizing an opportunity for gain 
in under-running the man hour budget.  An approach is made to the local union business 
agent with a proposal to enter into a gainsharing agreement in order to harness the energy 
and creativity of the tradesmen who will be working the job.  In reviewing the documents 
and through discussion with the contractor, the business agent is satisfied that the 
contracted man hours represent a realistic figure and that there is indeed potential for gain.  
The parties agree to develop within a period of weeks, a letter agreement spelling out the 
specifics of their project gainsharing plan.  They further agree to jointly monitor the 
performance of the plan should there be any need to make adjustments along the way. 
 
This being their first attempt at gainsharing, they prefer to keep it as simple as possible.  It 
will be a single factor formula focusing solely on direct labor productivity.  The baseline 
for determination of gain will be the estimated man-hours.  If the project is completed for 
less hours than this contact bid number, the under run hours multiplied by the contractual 
hourly rate (wage & fringes) will constitute the gainsharing pool to be divided between the 
contractor and the tradesmen who worked the job.  No formula is specified in the 
distribution to salaried project personnel, but it is presumed that the contractor will be 
guided in his judgment by the size of the gainsharing award realized by individual 
tradesmen.  Should the contractor neglect to reward his salaried employees proportional to 
that of the tradesmen, it is unlikely that they will actively support future gainsharing 
efforts. 
 
That portion of the gain directed to the bargaining unit workforce, will be distributed to all 
qualified gainsharing participants.  “Qualified” in this case means working the job to 
completion.  A quit or termination for cause would disqualify a tradesman from sharing in 
the pool.  All distributions to the bargaining unit workforce/trades will be on the basis of 
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proportional hours worked, including overtime hours.   If tradesman “A” worked 90% of 
the hours worked by tradesman “B”, “A” would receive 90% of the sum distributed to “B”.  
Should there be a pool for distribution at the conclusion of the project, a single gainsharing 
payment to tradesmen will be made within 15 days of client’s final payment to contractor.   
 
One final point; since in the above scenario distribution of gains is made only at the 
conclusion of the project, it is important that the contractor prepare and communicate 
progress reports on a regular and frequent basis, monthly at a minimum, but weekly would 
be better. 
 
Archetype Plan “B”  The  Project GOAL Model 
 
If a generating station outage can be completed ahead of schedule, the client will be able to 
close out an expensive contract for purchase of replacement power.  The client proposes to 
share that savings with the contractor, who in turn offers a portion of that share to the 
craftsmen workforce.  Additionally, the contractor hopes to reduce a tool loss expense that 
has been growing larger of late.  This is negotiated with the local union, to be funded by a 
pool of funds set aside by the contractor. 
 
Sample GOAL Plan Components 
 
Type of Contract: Negotiated Time & Materials  
Initiating Party:   Client (schedule) and Contractor (tool loss) 
Partnering Parties:   Client, Contractor and Local union 
 
Performance Measures:  Multiple (schedule and tool loss) 
Baseline / Standard:  Negotiated 
Stretch Targets   Negotiated 
$ Pool:    Budgeted  
                                                            * Client (schedule) 
                                                            * Contractor (tool loss) 
Participation / Distribution: Negotiated 
Contractor Distribution:  Contractor Discretion 
Contractor Disqualifier:           “Quality” Savings Clause – 15 Day Period 
Craftsmen Distribution:  Proportional to All Hours Worked 
Craftsmen Disqualifier:  Quits and Termination for Cause 
Payout Frequency:  15 Days after End of Project / No Holdback 
 
Idea Generation:   Suggestion System 
Communication:   Weekly Crew Meeting 
Oversight:    Client, Contractor & Business Agent 
Craft Orientation:   Contractor & Business Agent  
Administration:   Contractor and Client 
 
This plan has two initiating parties.  It is the client that recognizes a potential source of 
gain in an early close out of a power purchasing agreement.  And it is the contractor that 
envisions less expense and greater tool availability through reduction of tool loss.  
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Recognizing that tradesmen behavior is key to achieving success regarding both measures, 
they jointly invite the local union business agent to consider entering into a gainsharing 
arrangement. 
 
Following discussion with client and contractor and in reviewing relevant documents, the 
business agent is convinced that the workforce has a reasonable chance of impacting both 
schedule and tool loss. The three parties agree to develop a letter of agreement spelling out 
the specifics of their project gainsharing plan.  They further agree to jointly monitor the 
performance of the plan should there be any need to make adjustments along the way. 
 
Central to plan development is a three-way negotiation in which a series of targets and 
rewards are established reflecting different levels of accomplishment with regard to the 
two performance measures.  Unlike the Project Bid Model, the savings (gain) pool here is 
not directly generated by the mechanics of the construction contract but rather is indirectly 
funded by client (schedule) and contractor (tool loss).  If the client chooses to divulge the 
amount of savings realized through early termination of the outage power supply contract, 
a distribution ratio (client/contractor/tradesmen) might be negotiated.  Otherwise, the client 
may specify a sum ($X) to be shared between contractor and tradesmen at various levels of 
performance as indicated by the table below. 
 
 Schedule Performance (Project Completion Prior to Contractual Deadline) 
 
Target    Deadline less 1 week  $ X  
Stretch Target   Deadline less 2 weeks  $ 2X 
Super Stretch Target  Deadline less 3 weeks  $ 3X 
 
On projects with distinct milestones or deliverables, it is also possible to set multiple 
schedule targets rather than just one as indicated in the above example.  In the case of 
multiple sequential targets it may be desirable to consciously design less taxing goals early 
in the job-cycle to increase the chances of some “early wins” and consequent confidence 
and interest building on the part of craft. 
 
Regarding the tool loss performance incentive, that sum ($Y) would generally be 
negotiated between contractor and union.  The client may choose to participate in funding 
this pool should there be a projected advantage to the firm’s association with a successful 
tool loss effort by a contractor on the client’s property. 
 
Tool Loss ($ Value of Tool Loss through Duration of Project) 
 
Target    20% loss reduction  $ Y 
Stretch Target   40% loss reduction  $ 2Y  
Super Stretch Target  70% loss reduction  $ 4 Y 
 
The size of the reward multiplier for stretch and super stretch achievement may be a 
straight line function of the expanded target, as in the schedule performance example. 
Alternatively, as in the tool loss example it may be a non-linear function that recognizes 
and rewards the much greater difficulty of achieving the higher targets.  For distribution 
purposes, the schedule and tool loss measures are independent of each other. Consequently 
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there could be a payout on one, but not on the other, or both measures may result in 
payout, but at different levels of target achievement. 
 
No formula is specified with regard to distribution within the ranks of salaried project 
personnel, but as with the Bid Model, it is presumed that the contractor will be guided in 
judgment by the size of the gainsharing award realized by individual tradesmen.  All 
distributions to the bargaining unit workforce will be on the basis of proportional hour 
worked (including overtime hours).   If tradesman “A” worked 90% of the hours worked 
by tradesman “B”, “A” would receive 90% of the sum distributed to “B”.  Only “qualified” 
tradesmen will participate in the distribution, qualification entailing no quits or 
terminations for cause.  
 
There is a qualification stipulation as well regarding the schedule performance measure.  
Should the plant experience a forced outage due to poor workmanship during the initial 15 
days of operation following conclusion of the project, there will be no payout.  Also, since 
it has been determined to provide distribution only at the conclusion of the project, it is 
important that the contractor prepare and communicate progress reports on a regular and 
frequent basis, monthly at a minimum, but weekly or daily would be better. 
 
The two archetypal plans described above provide a general outline of how the Bid and 
Goal Models differ, as well as indications of how gainsharing plans may be tailored to 
differing circumstances.  Pages 27-33 provide specific tools for further explanation and use 
in defining the variables of formula development and structural program issues for your 
situation.   
 
Creating the Plan for GAIN 
 
Beyond the establishment of appropriately tailored measures, targets, and the many 
mechanics of sharing, creating gain is the shared responsibility of the contractor and 
union, together with the owner/operator if they are principally involved.  The contractor 
and owner must provide adequate resources and appropriate attention to planning so that 
the work environment and circumstances can be supportive of craft motivation and 
innovation.  In addition, success hinges on the extent to which there is an atmosphere of 
openness to new ideas for accomplishing the work and management practices in place for 
selecting and developing improvement ideas.  Such intentional involvement of craft 
establishes a situation in which craft can contribute either through individual awareness 
and action or as collaborative-systemic improvements identified through collective thought 
and application of experience.    
 
Individual Awareness 
 
There is a component of creating gain that does not require any invention beyond those 
specifics previously discussed under the heading of Constructing the Formula for 
SHARING.  If a good job has been done in establishing an appropriate formula and results 
are well communicated, you can expect some degree of improvement simply through the 
individual tradesman’s awareness of the linkage between work habits, the group’s 
performance, and eventual payout.  
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An example of individual awareness creating gain would be where a tradesman working on 
a gainsharing job clocks more wrench time (time on the tools) by simply using a bit of 
fore-thought in gathering up necessary tools and supplies at the outset of a task rather than 
making multiple trips to the crib.  Another example would be simply stopping to pick up a 
piece of scrap that might pose a safety hazard.  The source of improvement in both of these 
cases resides in the individual. They will likely not communicate to peers or supervision 
that they are doing anything differently, in fact the individual may not even be aware they 
have changed their behavior.   
 
Collaborative-Systemic Improvements 
 
A second, and potentially large, source of gain resides in collaborative-systemic 
improvements.  Unlike the individual awareness component described above, these 
improvements are the conscious product of more than one mind working together in the 
generation, approval, communication and implementation of a work practice innovation.  
For example, a tradesman might make a suggestion to the supervisor to establish smaller 
temporary tool cribs closer to the various work sites.  Or a safety committee might conduct 
an analysis of incidents that suggests the value of washing down a work area prior to 
commencement of work in order to reduce the frequency of incidents involving foreign 
objects in eyes.  In an outage environment where the nature of the work process is well 
established, such systemic improvements will likely relate to site specific work conditions 
and practices.  In project or new construction environments there may be larger systemic 
needs and greater potential for “big ticket” improvements.  
 
Employee Involvement 
 
In gainsharing, gain is produced both by workers’ intensification of effort and attention 
(working harder) as well as by workers’ contribution of ideas to improve the 
production/construction process (working smarter).  It has been an axiom of employee 
involvement efforts of the last 25 years that the key is for workers to work smarter not 
harder.   That catch phrase is a characteristically American overstatement to make the 
point that industry needs to fully tap and engage the knowledge, experience, and creativity 
of employees.  In this regard, successful employee involvement ensures that both the 
transfer of knowledge and the process of developing how work is accomplished converge 
as a two-way exchange between workers and employers. 
 
Employee involvement in the broader construction industry has developed dramatically in 
recent decades.  There are a wide array of principles and practices that have been, and 
continue to be, used with the goal of engaging employees as partners in conducting the 
work.  These practices range from informal suggestion systems; to various quality 
programs in which employees study and identify means for improving performance; to 
self-managed work teams that are fully responsible for determining the tasks, resources 
needed, methods used, coordination with other teams, and performance requirements.   
In the more progressive situations, employee involvement is embedded within participative 
management practices, or formalized partnering approaches, that seek to fully engage 
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employees in identifying and solving problems as well as looking for new opportunities for 
productivity and employee satisfaction.   
 
While many elements of contemporary employee involvement practices are applicable in 
the energy construction industry, there exist some fundamental challenges to formalized 
and broad-scale employee involvement in our industry.  The primary challenges are due to 
the reliance upon a traveler workforce and the relatively short-term nature and intensity of 
most project and outage work.  Given these conditions it is difficult to establish 
involvement practices that require long-term working structures and relationships along 
with “off-tool” problem solving activities.  Although not directly involving the employee, 
if gainsharing is established as a consistent business practice, part of the requirement for 
ongoing relationships can be fulfilled through continuing tripartite engagement in program 
development and sponsorship.   
 
On the more immediate employee involvement level, the possibilities remain wide-ranging 
for establishing activities that will energize and enable the parties to work together for 
greater productivity and partnership.   Some of the categories to focus on and options for 
activities are listed in brief below, followed by more thorough explanations of each 
category.  
 
Program Design: 
? Engage craft in identification of measures & targets 
? Conduct pre and post-job understanding/insight surveys 
 
Improvement Idea Generation: 
? Suggestion system 
? Problem-solving teams/task-force 
 
Communication:  
? Orientation session and informational materials 
? Performance status updates 
 
Program Design  
 
At the outset there are several important program design points to consider in planning for 
craft buy-in and the inclusion of employee knowledge as part of your gainsharing program.  
The first one relates to tapping the experience and participation of craft when developing 
gainshare measures and performance targets.  Experience has shown that good relations 
between the primary players can allow for an environment where union business agents or 
managers can make substantive contributions to the formulation of what and how to 
measure performance, without necessarily having to get involved with the bid cost figures.   
Depending on your facility’s previous experience with gainsharing, and thereby that of 
your year-round workforce, representative conversations with these craft prior to project 
start-up can generate valuable insight into what factors should be considered as a 
gainsharing program is designed. 
 
Another aspect for consideration relates to the use of written craft surveys, or 
questionnaires. As described in detail in the later section on Using Surveys to Improve 
Program Design, although conducting surveys can be time consuming and not applicable 
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to all situations, surveys are one additional means of gathering input and insight from craft 
to use in program design.  If used properly, such instruments can also serve to show craft 
that their ideas are being considered and incorporated in beneficial manners.     
 
Improvement Idea Generation 
 
The most rudimentary form of identifying ideas for systemic improvement is the “good 
idea” generated by an individual and communicated informally through on-the-job 
conversation or at weekly crew meetings to a responsive foreman or supervisor.  Of course 
the success of this minimal-structure approach to employee involvement is contingent 
upon the practice of a management style by the contractor’s supervisors and foremen that 
is encouraging of such tradesmen contributions.  Should first and second level 
management style not be as uniformly supportive of unsolicited advice, and/or if the 
workforce is not confident that their ideas will be given due consideration, then it may be 
desirable to formalize a suggestion system.   
 
A formalized system may be designed to entail two steps.  An improvement idea may be 
acted on immediately at the supervisor level if it does not involve monetary expenditure 
over an established level and does not challenge any existing policy or labor contract 
provision.  Should a recommendation require greater expenditure and/or push policy or 
contractual envelopes, it may be subsequently reviewed by higher management and/or the 
business agent for final disposition.  If a formalized suggestion system has been employed, 
it is important that the proposing individual receives a prompt response. 
 
In addition to the various contemporary employee involvement practices described 
previously, long-term employment environments often employ ad-hoc problem-solving 
teams composed of workers removed from their regular duties for extended periods of 
time.  Such teams conduct formal analyses of operational problems and develop detailed 
systemic improvement proposals.  Although perhaps different for project or new 
construction work, given the short duration and consequent intensity of outage and short 
project work it is not likely that problem-solving teams will play much of a role.  An 
exception to this might be the formation of an advance outage team composed of local 
permanent employees of a facility teamed up with foremen from the hall brought in early.  
Together these individuals can work on issues raised in the previous outage, perhaps as 
solicited from travelers as they departed. 
 
When designing the means for improvement idea generation, as well as more generally the 
overall type and extent of craft involvement, there is an important rule to remember.  This 
rule is that craft are more inclined to look for performance improvements if they not only 
can see a clear line of sight from incentive to reward, but that they can contribute from 
their knowledge with trust that their ideas have a chance of being acted upon. 
 
Communication 
 
Ensuring a free flow of pertinent information amongst all parties is critical to the success 
of gainsharing implementation.  In addition to the inherent communication needs discussed 
above in relation to program design and idea generation, there are two additional important 
areas to consider.  The first has to do with how the gainsharing program is presented to 
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craft at the beginning of the job.  Presumably the program would have been identified and 
promoted by the union in soliciting workers for the job, so on arrival craft should have 
some idea that gainsharing is in effect.  However, the next step is making sure that 
everyone has an adequate understanding of measures, targets, and conditions for 
maintaining eligibility.   Introduction of these program specifics, along with explanation or 
training on the premises of gainsharing (i.e., sharing gains made available through 
improved performance, work smarter, etc.) should be done as part of regular start-up job 
orientation meetings.  Providing a one or two-page written description of the specifics 
which craft can walk away from the meeting with further builds understanding and ensures 
that everyone is working from the same information base. 
 
The second matter relates to ensuring that craft understand exactly what progress they are 
making on the program’s milestones and consequent gain pay-outs.  Successful programs 
have developed simple graphic charts or graphs portraying the status of the relevant 
measurements and made these available in lunch rooms and/or other readily accessible 
locations on site.   So that generating this information does not create undue extra work, 
the contractor can use the same project management or accounting software program(s) 
that are tracking internal reporting needs.  In addition, verbal updates in support of written 
materials can be given by the contractor at job meetings.  The important things to 
remember here are that progress information should be easy to understand so everyone is 
on the same page, accurate so that craft can trust the reliability of the contractor, and 
written so as to minimize the problem of multiple interpretations being in play at the same 
time.  Provided with full information, craft can engage all the more constructively to adapt 
their performance and participate in the various other avenues of employee involvement 
discussed above.     
 
How extensively a contractor’s project management style is modified in the areas of 
program design, improvement idea generation, and communication is a matter for 
negotiation among the partners to the project.  Customization will always be a necessary 
hallmark of gainsharing in the industry, given the diversity of market conditions, pre-
existing relationships, varieties of management styles, local union cultures, scope of work, 
length of projects, etc.   
 
Framework for Working Smarter 
 
As indicated previously, the nature of construction energy industry work does not always 
lend itself to formalized improvement idea generation or problem-solving.  However, 
regardless of the amount of time or the methods used for these tasks, some basic principles 
exist that can provide explicit guidance when informal intuitive means may benefit from a 
little more structure.  
 
The following Framework for Working Smarter offers a step-by-step approach that can be 
helpful for linking the activities of identifying things that might need to change to the 
creative consideration and definition of what and how to make targeted improvements. 
This framework also promotes active feedback loops between craft and with the contractor 
for sharing information and making continual improvements based on mid-stream 
evaluation of implemented changes.  
Framework for Working Smarter 
                      for Quality, Productivity, Safety & Earnings 
 
 
 
1. Identify Areas for Improvement 
  “What work activities could be more efficient/safer?” 
 
2. Generate Creative Improvement Options 
  Chart work flow process, step-by-step, then ask: 
  “What might you do to make activities more efficient/safer?” 
 
3. Select Improvements 
  “Which improvement options show the most promise?” 
 
4. Define & Implement Plans 
 “What’s the best way to implement these improvements?” 
 Now, proceed with the changes… 
 
5. Monitor, Evaluate & Refine Improvements  
  “How have the improvements impacted performance?” 
  “Now that we know how the improvements are working out,  
   how can we make things work even better?” 
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Using Surveys to Improve Program Design 
 
As explained previously in the Handbook, administering a craft survey/questionnaire at the 
outset, mid-job, and/or at the end of the outage or project can provide valuable information 
toward current-year adaptations or for future-year improvements in your gainsharing 
program.  The focus and selection of questions for such surveys will depend upon what 
information will be useful and at what stage of the outage the questions are being asked.  
 
At job start-up questions are likely to be most useful if oriented to learning about how well 
craft understand the program and what expectations or concerns they have about it.  
Responses can be used to identify the need for better explaining program specifics and/or 
how to ensure that communication procedures and suggestion systems might be best  
tailored.  A mid-job questionnaire would have a similar focus, but could also be used to get 
a better sense of how well your system of progress reporting is working and/or if there are 
missed opportunities for meeting target goals.    
 
Although questionnaires at both of the above stages will provide insight that can be used to 
make improvements for future year programs, a post-job survey is focused specifically on 
this potential.  Apart from evaluating specific program design elements, a post-survey 
provides baseline information that can be tracked over multiple years. This allows you to 
really understand factors about your gainsharing program’s impact on craft incentive to 
return, what measures (at what target levels) provide the best incentives, how to best solicit 
and respond to craft suggestions, and what productivity and work arrangement issues really 
need to be addressed outside of your gainsharing program.  
 
Conducting survey questionnaires, even if done informally, takes time.  It also sets up an 
expectation from craft that management will do something with the comments provided to 
them.  Much of the information and value gained from questionnaires can arguably be 
gathered through job meeting discussions, impromptu conversations with union stewards, 
or simply company staff observations.  However, investing the time formalizes a learning 
process and enables you to look comprehensively at the issues, rather than just those that 
appear most obviously.  Whether such an intentional approach makes sense in your 
circumstance is a matter for consideration by your program’s principal players. 
 
An important distinction to make in the application of surveys is between those that are 
intended to gauge craft understanding of a gainshare program and/or solicit ideas for 
program improvements, versus those aimed at seeking ideas for actual on-site work 
process or practice improvements.  For the purposes of this Handbook, soliciting this latter 
type of information is covered as an intention of employee involvement efforts specific to 
improvement idea generation, and not as part of survey content. 
 
Sample Questions 
 
This section suggests sample questions that may be appropriate to use or adapt if you are 
developing a craft questionnaire.  As mentioned previously, ultimately questions should be 
tailored to address those information points of most value to the design of your program. 
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Potential Pre-Job Questions 
 
1. How did you hear about the gainsharing plan on this project? 
2. What have you been told about how the gainsharing program will work on this job? 
3. At the time of your referral to this job, could you have passed and been referred to a 
different job?  If yes, how did the gainsharing opportunity influence your decision to 
take this job? 
4. What are you hoping to experience on this job due to the gainsharing program?  
Please describe your expectations relative to: 
•  Money 
•  Application of your knowledge 
•  Improvements to the work environment 
•  Productivity and/or safety 
•  Relations between union, contractor, and owner 
•  Other? 
 
Potential Post-Job Questions 
 
1. How satisfied are you with the overall gainsharing program on this job? 
 Please describe your satisfaction relative to: 
•  Money 
•  Application of your knowledge 
•  Improvements to the work environment 
•  Productivity and/or safety 
•  Relations between union, contractor, and owner 
•  Other? 
2. Would you want to work on a gainsharing project again if you had the chance in the 
future?  Please say why, or why not. 
3. How well did the suggestion system (or enter whatever other means were actually 
used) provide you with opportunities to impact the way work was done? 
4. Were the orientation and other employee involvement activities (enter types of 
activities actually used) helpful?  Please describe in what ways these could have been 
more helpful or effective. 
5. Please describe what was effective, and what was ineffective, about the ways in 
which (enter those gainsharing aspects actually used…performance monitoring, team 
problem solving, etc.) were used. 
6. What specific suggestions do you have for improving the way that future 
construction gainsharing projects are set-up and administered? 
 
Additional Post-Job Question Topics: 
 
• Specifics on value of crew meetings 
• Extent to which employee ideas and suggestions were listened to and used  by the 
various managers and by other employees 
• Level of trust between workers and contractor representatives 
• Quality of supervision and committee oversight/monitoring, etc. 
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• Level of cooperation amongst employees in attaining gainsharing goals 
• Perception of fairness and honesty on gainsharing calculations 
• Perception of contractor’s commitment to improving relationship with union 
• Perception of union’s commitment to improving relationship with contractor 
• If owner is involved on-site, perception of relationship between union and owner 
• Feelings about completion pay-out  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Post Outage Craft Questionnaire 
 
We need your opinions to continue improving your earnings! 
 
This is the second questionnaire you have been asked to fill-out. As you may recall, the 
first one was at the beginning of the outage.  It was to hear your thoughts and 
expectations on the gainsharing program at the outset.  Now that the outage is over and 
you know better the outcomes, we’d like your reactions and your ideas for improving 
gainsharing in the future at Company X.  
 
Your responses to this questionnaire will help this facility’s owner, contractor, and union 
representatives understand how to improve gainsharing programs in the future.  
 
First, we have questions on what you think about this year’s gainsharing program. 
 
1. Now that the outage is over and you know the outcomes on gainsharing, what’s your 
honest opinion about this year’s program? 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
2. How hard or easy did it turn out to be to reach the highest pay-out levels on each of 
the following performance measures?  Please circle your rating. 
 
       HARD                                                             EASY 
 
Safety               4  3  2  1 
Productivity 4  3  2  1 
Quality  4  3  2  1 
 
If it was HARD, please explain WHY for each measure. 
 
Safety  ____________________________________________________ 
Productivity ____________________________________________________ 
Quality  ____________________________________________________ 
 
3. In order to maximize your gain (pay-out), did you have all the information you needed 
on the following points: 
 
A.  The parts of your work that were being measured                      
I had enough info  ?              I could have used more info ? 
B.  How your performance was being measured                               
I had enough info  ?              I could have used more info ? 
 C.  How you stayed eligible for receiving a payout     
I had enough info  ?              I could have used more info ? 
 
What should have been explained better?   
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
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4. How did your work habits, and those of your brothers, change to maximize your pay-
out?   Please check all that apply. 
 
? Better on-the-job planning by crews  
? Better problem solving on-site 
? Better attendance 
? Better communication among crew members 
? More personal responsibility 
? Other 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As Company X plans for future gainsharing improvements, which of the following 
ideas could help you improve individual and/or group performance, thereby increasing 
your gainshare bonus?  Please check the TWO (2) you feel are most important. 
 
? Include craft in work planning 
? Include craft in estimating various work elements 
? Include craft in conducting job safety analysis reviews 
? Tool box meetings to plan daily/weekly work  
? Suggestion system allowing improvement ideas to be considered  
? Other ___________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What other suggestions do you have for how to improve Company X’s gainsharing 
programs in the future?   
______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
  
Finally, we would like to ask you some questions about yourself. 
 
7.   Have you worked before on a job with a gainsharing plan?     Yes ?              No ? 
 
8.   At the time you were referred to this job, could you have passed and been referred to 
a different job?         Yes ?              No ? 
        
9.   How much did this year’s gainsharing plan effect your decision to sign on for this 
outage?  Please circle your rating. 
 
 MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE                                              DIDN’T REALLY MATTER 
 
   4   3   2   1 
 
10.  Which union are you a member of?  _____________________________________ 
 
11.  Are you a permanent maintenance employee at this facility?   Yes ?              No ? 
 
Date you completed this questionnaire: _______ 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH for helping us understand how to improve gainsharing at 
Company X. 
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Setting Up Your Gainsharing Program 
 
This Handbook has now laid out the basics of gainsharing and described many of the 
major considerations in determining if gainsharing is a good fit to your circumstances.    
To assist you in more concretely understanding how to proceed with developing and 
implementing a program, the following pages provide a variety of tools and support 
materials.   
 
First is a step-by-step graphic representing, in sequence, the various developmental 
activities that have been described throughout the handbook.  This is offered only as an 
overview to help you envision the overall endeavor.  Invariably, your situation will 
require adaptation of these steps based upon your judgment and tailoring the process to 
your unique needs and available resources.  Following the graphic there is a series of 
checklists and  formula worksheets to serve as examples for your consideration and use. 
 
The Project Set-Up Checklist/Template provides an overall checklist of essential issues 
that should be addressed, and ultimately specified, in the design of your gainsharing 
program.  The Project Bid Model and Project Goal Model Worksheets are provided using 
hypothetical examples to illustrate potential gain measures and share formulas.  Blank 
worksheets are included as well to assist in developing actual figures for your situation.   
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Develop   
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Close-Out 
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working smarter,  & 
reporting progress 
 
• Are the conditions 
right for gainsharing  
at our facility? 
• What is it we hope to 
accomplish? 
• Contact and enroll 
partners 
• Develop & deliver 
program description 
materials & craft 
presentations 
• Clarify questions 
 
• Assess impacts on 
craft motivation 
• Evaluate measures, 
targets, & suggestion 
system 
• Learn future program  
improvements  
• Final pay-out of 
realized gain, as 
accrued 
• Assess outcomes 
(productivity targets, 
safety statistics, craft 
participation, etc.) 
• Determine potential 
improvements for 
future year programs 
                             At Least 2-3 Months Prior to Job Start                            
Gainsharing Program Development & Implementation 
Process Steps 
 Establish 
Owner-  
Contractor - 
Union Agreement
At Job Start-Up 
Pre-Job  
Craft Survey 
• On-site survey on 
craft expectations & 
understanding  of 
gainsharing plan  
• Oversight team 
assessment of 
communication 
needs
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Gainsharing Program 
SET-UP CHECKLIST /TEMPLATE 
 
1.   Project Name/Location: ________________________________________________ 
               Description: ________________________________________________ 
 
2.   Parties to Agreement: Client___________________________________________         
    Contractor_______________________________________     
    Union __________________________________________ 
 
3.   Type of Contract: Negotiated Time & Materials_____ 
    Guaranteed Maximum Cost   _____ 
    Other ___________________________________________ 
 
4.   Contracted Start Date:  _________________ 
5.   Contracted Completion Date:  _________________ 
 
6.   Type of Gainshare Project: 
 
 A. Project Bid Model _____ 
 B. Project Goal Model _____ 
 C.  Combined Project Goal/Project Bid Model ____ 
 
7. Gain Share Program Specifics: See attached Gain Share Program Worksheet  
 
8.   Gain Distribution Logistics:  
  
 Between Client and Contractor 
A. Distribution Percentage split:  Client _______  Contractor ________  
up to $______ then Percentage Changes to Client _______  Contractor ________ 
 
 Between Contractor and Salaried Employees 
 A.  Distribution Percentage split:  Capital Reinvestment ______ Employee Salary____ 
 B.  Distribution: Proportional to hours worked ____  Other_______________________  
 C.  Disqualifier: Specify terms  ____________________________________________ 
 D.  Payout Pool $: Specify amount   ________________________________________ 
 E.  Payout Frequency: ___ days after end of project.  Holdback ___ % for _____ days 
 
 Between Contractor and Bargaining Unit Tradesmen   
 A.  Distribution Percentage split:  (see Worksheet) 
 B.  Distribution:  Proportional to hours worked ___Other  _______________________ 
 C.  Disqualifier:  Quits and/or termination for cause___ Other____________________ 
 D.  Payout Pool $: (See Worksheet) 
 E.  Payout Frequency: ___ days after end of project. Holdback ___ % for ______days 
 
9.   Gainsharing Oversight/Coordination: 
    
 A.  Plan Administration Responsibility:        ____Client  ____ Contractor  ____Union 
 B.  Performance Monitoring Responsibility: ____Client  ____ Contractor  ____Union 
 C.  Process for monitoring progress (describe) _______________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 D.  Process for approving/implementing improvement ideas (describe)_____________ 
       __________________________________________________________________ 
       __________________________________________________________________ 
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 E.  How progress/results information will be distributed (describe)  ________________ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
  
10.   Employee Involvement:   
  
 Orientation  
 
 A.  Presented by:_______________________________________________________ 
  
 B.  Topics: Gain-Goal Sharing Philosophy ____  Program Logistics _____ 
  Identifying Means of Improvement ____   Other____________________________ 
     
 Communication 
  
 A.   Weekly Crew Meetings (specify where held/who leads/format) ________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 B. Toolbox Meetings (specify where held/when/who leads/format)________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 C. Posting of Progress/Results (specify when/where/what)  _____________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 D.  Final Notification of Pay-Out/Results (specify when/how) _____________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Idea Generation 
  
 A.  Suggestion System (describe)__________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 B.  Team Problem Solving (describe)________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 C.  Other (describe) _____________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.   Dispute Resolution Process: 
 
  Any disputes arising in conjunction with the gainsharing components of this project 
 will be resolved in the following manner:____________________________________ 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12.   Other Relevant Information:   
 
 A. Additional information to be included in agreement: ________________________ 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
       _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  B.  Outstanding issues to be resolved:  ______________________________________ 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________
SAMPLE (for Explanation Only) 
 
PROJECT BID MODEL WORKSHEET 
GAIN SHARE PROGRAM : Between Contractor and Bargaining Unit Tradesmen 
Project Name/Location: _________________________  Projected Start/Finish Dates_________________________ 
 
 
    
A. Performance Measure:    
Productivity (Man hours)    
 
    
B. Contractor Gain Share $ % Tradesmen Gain Share $ %      (to be negotiated at outset)  
50% 50%   
 
    
C. Gain Share Pool $           =           Bid Man Hours        --       Actual Tradesmen Hours     x Hourly Rate (wage & fringe)  
$300,000 48,000 hours (8 weeks) 42,000 hours (7 weeks) $50.00 
 
    
D. Tradesmen Share $         =   Gain Share Pool $ (C.)     -- Contractor Share  
$150,000 $300,000 $150,000  
 
    
E. Ind. Tradesmen Pay-Out =     Ind. Tradesman Hours     ÷ Total Tradesmen Hours       x Tradesman Share $ (D.) 
$1,500 420 hours 42,000 hours $150,000 
 
 
Note Additional Conditions: 
 
1.   When completing worksheet at the outset of a job, only items A and B can be filled in.  Other items are dependent upon overall job performance 
accounting after job completion. 
2.   Assumptions for sample calculations:   
 Utility shut-down/scheduled maintenance, 100 tradesmen, 6 day weeks @ 10 hour days for 8 weeks = 48,000 total job bid man hours.  
 Contractor-Tradesmen split gain share 50/50% 
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PROJECT BID MODEL WORKSHEET 
GAIN SHARE PROGRAM : Between Contractor and Bargaining Unit Tradesmen 
Project Name/Location: _________________________  Projected Start/Finish Dates_________________________ 
 
 
    
A. Performance Measure:    
     Productivity (Man hours)    
 
    
B. Contractor Gain Share $ % Tradesmen Gain Share $ %      (to be negotiated at outset)  
% %   
 
    
C. Gain Share Pool $           =           Bid Man Hours        --       Actual Tradesmen Hours     x Hourly Rate (wage & fringe)  
$ hours hours $ 
 
    
D. Tradesmen Share $         =   Gain Share Pool $ (C.)     -- Contractor Share  
$ $ $  
 
    
E. Ind. Tradesmen Pay-Out =     Ind. Tradesman Hours     ÷ Total Tradesmen Hours       x Tradesman Share $ (D.) 
$ hours hours $ 
 
 
Note Additional Conditions: 
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SAMPLE (for Explanation Only) 
 
PROJECT GOAL MODEL WORKSHEET 
GAIN SHARE PROGRAM : Between Contractor and Bargaining Unit Tradesmen 
Project Name/Location: _________________________  Projected Start/Finish Dates_________________________ 
 
 Performance 
Measure 
Potential/Max. 
Gain Share  
Pool $ 
A.  Baseline/ 
     Standard      
B. Negotiated     
Incremental   
Gain Share 
C. Performance    
Goal Target 
D.  Total  Approx. per 
Tradesman      Pay-Out 
Amount Pay-Out  
     B x C = D * see formula
1.  Schedule  $400,000 8 week duration $120,000 p/week a. on-time $ 0 $0 
 (from client/   b. 1 week early $ 120,000 $1,200 
 contractor to trades)   c. 2 weeks early $ 240,000 $2,400 
   + $40,000 bonus d. 3 weeks early $ 400,000 $4,000 
     C ÷ B = D  
2.  Materials/Supplies $100,000 Actual savings 50% of savings a. @ bid estimate $ 0 $0 
 (from client/   b. $50,000 savings $ 25,000 $250 
 contractor)   c. $100,000 savings $ 50,000 $500 
    d. $200,000 savings $ 100,000 $1,000 
     A – C x B = D  
3.  Safety/Accidents $10,000 2 reportable  $5,000 p/accident a.   2 $  0 $0 
 (from contractor)   b.   1 $  5,000 $50 
    c.   0 $  10,000 $100 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Per Tradesman Pay-Out Formula: D. Total pay-out $ ÷ total job man hours x individual tradesman’s hours worked = individual pay-out $ 
Assumptions for sample calculations:  Utility shut-down/scheduled maintenance, 100 tradesmen @ 10 hour days for project duration.   
d.   
     C ÷ B = D  
4.  Tool Loss $20,000 $40,000 loss 50% of savings a. $ 0 savings $ 0 $0 
 (from client/    b. $ 10,000 savings $ 5,000 $50 
 contractor)   c. $ 20,000 savings $ 10,000 $100 
    d. $ 40,000 savings $ 20,000 $200 
       If targets # 5 (a & b) are met,   B = D  
5. Satisfied Customer  $10,000 Acceptable perf. $ 10,000 a.   no call backs   
 (from contractor)   b.   $10,000 $100 
    c.     
       
TOTAL: $540,000      
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PROJECT GOAL MODEL WORKSHEET 
GAIN SHARE PROGRAM : Between Contractor and Bargaining Unit Tradesmen 
Project Name/Location: _________________________  Projected Start/Finish Dates_________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Per Tradesman Pay-Out Formula: D. Total pay-out $ ÷ total job man hours X individual craftsman’s hours worked = individual pay-out $
Performance 
Measure 
Potential/Max. 
Gain Share  
Pool $ 
A.  Baseline/ 
     Standard      
B. Negotiated     
Incremental   
Gain Share 
C. Performance    
Goal Target 
D.  Total  
    Pay-Out 
Amount 
Approx. per 
Tradesman 
Pay-Out  
      * see formula
1.      a.  $  $ 
    b.  $  $ 
    c.  $  $ 
    d.  $ $ 
       
2.      a.  $  $ 
    b.  $  $ 
    c.  $  $ 
    d.  $  $ 
       
3.      a. $   $ 
    b.    $   $ 
    c.    $   $ 
    d.   
       
4.      a.  $  $ 
    b.  $  $ 
    c.  $  $ 
    d.  $  $ 
    ,     
5.     a.    
    b.  $ $ 
    c.   
       
TOTAL:       
 
Part Two:  Pilot and Case Studies Projects 
 
Introduction 
 
This section of the Gainsharing Handbook provides a summary of pilot and case studies 
as well as the lessons learned from the Tripartite Gainsharing Committee’s research 
project conducted by Cornell University’s School of Industrial & Labor Relations.  Taken 
together with Part One’s description on the mechanics of gainsharing and program 
development, this section provides insight into the experience of those who have actually 
implemented gainsharing at energy production facilities in various locations under 
differing conditions.  
 
Case Profiles 
 
Three industry sites were directly involved in this project’s consultation and/or research 
activities.  These were: 
 
• PPL Montana / Power Maintenance Resources, Inc. / Boilermakers Local 11 
• Texas Genco / Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co, Inc./ Boilermakers Local 79, 
Pipefitters Local #211, Operators Local #450 
• Arkansas Nuclear One / Stone & Webster / Boilermakers Local 69 
 
The most active involvement was with large-scale outage work at a facility operated by 
PPL Montana where previous incentive plans and direct consulting from Cornell/ILR 
paved the way for a full-scale gainsharing program for 2005 outage work.  The second 
study, being of a smaller scale outage at a Texas Genco plant, profiles a “do-it-yourself” 
project in which the principals utilized a previous version of this Gainsharing Handbook 
to guide their successful development of a Spring 2005 outage program.  Both of these 
sites served as true pilot studies for this gainsharing research project in that the level of 
detail provided is rich and extensive and in some manner responsive to Cornell’s 
assistance.  Additionally, these two projects respectively represent the two primary 
gainsharing approaches of a) goal and b) bid.  
 
The third site, being Arkansas Nuclear One, has been employing gainsharing for several 
years independent of this Handbook and research project. Although primarily a case 
study description, it is reported here due to the depth of this facility’s experience with 
gainsharing for both outages and year-round operations.  Each of the three sites has 
different conditions in regard to previous experience with gainsharing, relations with and 
availability of local trades, and motivating business-case interests.   
 
Given this research project’s varying levels of engagement with the three sites, each case 
study is described and analyzed at a slightly different level of detail.  However, based on 
available information, each case is presented under the following four headings; 1) 
Project History & Circumstances, 2) Description of the Gainsharing Plan, 3) Program 
Outcomes, and 4) Lessons and Future Plans allowing the reader to consider both issues 
distinct to a case, as well as those which cut-across cases.  Concluding Part Two are 
sections entitled Additional Overall Lessons from Pilots/Case Studies and Proposed 
Criteria for Successful Gainsharing Implementation.  
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PPL Montana… Pilot Study  
 
The Principals: PPL Montana (operator) 
 Power Maintenance Resources, Inc. (contractor) 
 Local 11 Boilermakers (primary union) 
 
The Operation: 2,276 megawatt coal-fired facility (4 units) in Colstrip, Montana 
 
The Outage: 350 trades employed for 5 weeks (86,000 man-hours) to overhaul 
boiler and scrubbers on unit #2.  Job cost of $6.5M.  
 
Gainsharing Model Used:  Project Goal 
 
Project History and Circumstances 
 
PPL Montana’s Colstrip facility is located in southeast Montana, 125 miles from Billings.  
The operator has long employed Power Maintenance Resources, Inc. (PMRI) as a sole 
source contractor for both its maintenance and outage work.  The outages are performed 
utilizing a time and materials (T&M) contract with an incentive arrangement in place.   
 
As in all regions, there is considerable competition for an outage workforce from nearby 
facilities.  In this case PPL is competing with operations in North Dakota, Wyoming, 
Washington and Oregon.  Due to the Colstrip plant’s geographic isolation and a 
subsequent need to attract travelers for up to 60% of its skilled outage workforce, the 
operator had a history of offering contingency compensation and incentives at outage 
times.  Prior to the Spring 2005 outage, these included a variety of programs such as a 
bonus for group safety performance ($175 max.), a cost savings/productivity bonus ($175 
max.), foreman’s bonus, and since 1996 a subsistence, or “sub” pay rider, up to $50 per 
day for travelers.   
 
In 2004, PPL chose not to pay subsistence for the outage work.  Since the ’04 outage did 
not include a lot of boiler work, and therefore boilermakers were not critical path, the 
operator was comfortable in assuming the manpower risk that year.  However, when 
faced with a ’05 outage that entailed considerable boiler work on the critical path, the 
company acknowledged the need to offer a craft incentive in order to assure adequate 
labor to support a successful outage.  Rather than offer the traditional incentive that 
rewarded craftsmen for attendance, PPL wanted to offer a program that rewarded craft 
based upon measurable performance.  
 
The Tripartite Gainsharing Project was brought to the attention of the operator, contractor 
and Local 11 Boilermaker leadership in 2004 just prior to the beginning of that year’s 
outage.  Although too late to impact the PPL/PMRI program for that year, as the 
gainsharing project’s consultants, Cornell/ILR worked with the parties to facilitate their 
deliberations on program development for ’05 and to research into craft interests and 
attitudes about previous gainsharing arrangements at PPL through a survey questionnaire 
and on-site focus groups.  Scott Harbuck and Jeremy Clotfelter, project managers 
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respectively for PMRI and PPL, were primary collaborators in development of the final 
program design implemented for the facility’s Spring 2005 outage as described in this 
case study.  The program met the primary interests of providing a coordinated outage 
incentive program that combined all previous incentive measures into a single program 
funded through a set-aside pool established by the operator.  Local 11 business manager, 
Bob Hall, concurred with this approach and participated in the program development, 
with other trades content to let the Boilermakers take the lead in this regard.  
 
Description of the Gainsharing Program 
 
Performance Measures 
 
A multiple performance measure plan was designed focusing on 1) schedule, 2) safety, and 3) 
quality.   A description of each aspect follows in detail. A spreadsheet representing the specific 
measures and the actual performance and pay-out percentages is included at the end of this pilot 
study on pages 43-44.  80% of the gainsharing pool was fronted by the client, with the remainder 
funded by the contractor.  The client’s contribution was established by the amount budgeted in 
previous years for sub pay and other incentives. 
 
1. Schedule 
 
Given the contractor’s involvement with critical path projects, adherence to schedule was 
weighted heavily at 50%, being equal to safety and quality combined.  Five boiler related target 
dates were established as well as six scrubber related milestones.  Dollar values were placed on 
achieving each of these target dates, greater value assigned to the critical path boiler dates than to 
the scrubber dates. Three levels of award were established at 50%, 100%, and 120%.  The 100% 
level corresponded to achievement of the targeted/milepost date, being a reflection of historical 
performance.   
 
2.    Safety 
 
Safety was weighted second, at 30% of the total available gain pool.  The actual number of 
OSHA defined recordable accidents was established as the incident to be measured.  Five levels 
of award were provided.  Five or more recordables would result in no award for safety; four 
recordables would pay out at 25% of the 30% safety pool; three at 50%; two at 75%; one at 
100%; and no recordables would produce an award of 120%.  The payout metrics for recordable 
accidents was based on current OSHA rates for the construction industry. 
 
3.    Quality 
 
Quality was weighted third at 20%.  It had three components, two of which were based on test 
inspections (weld quality tests and boiler hydro test) and the last based on run time without 
incident (30 days).  Within this measure, weld quality was weighted most at 50%, with hydro test 
second at 30% and run time third at 20%.  While hydro test and run time were pass/fail 
measures, weld quality had four levels of award.  These were: greater then 9% rejects resulted in 
no award; 6-9% rejects delivered a 50% payout; 3-6% rejects paid out 100%; and less than 3% 
rejects triggered a 120% reward.  Contrary to safety, historical data showed a more consistent 
rate of rejects, with 4 % posted in 2004. 
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Employee Involvement 
 
No formal employee involvement structure was employed to generate systemic work 
improvements, nor were any reported.  It was anticipated that gains would be achieved through 
improved attention to work habits conducive to safety, quality and productivity, and that any 
suggestions for systemic improvement could be made and responded to though the existing 
informal chain of command. The client and contractor had high confidence in the existing 
atmosphere of open communication.  Tradesmen confirmed that they felt they could talk to their 
foremen as well as the next level up, and that the morning safety meeting lent itself well to this 
purpose.   
 
Design, Administration & Communication 
 
As mentioned earlier, design of the gainsharing formula rested with the client and contractor who 
subsequently sought concurrence from the Boilermakers business manager, who, in turn, “talked 
it up” at the hall to prospective workers.  An initial explanation of the program was made to 
trades at orientation meetings.  Subsequent monitoring of performance was handled jointly by 
the contractor and client who communicated results to the trades through the contractor’s project 
manager and foremen passing on information at morning safety meetings.  With the exception of 
the final payout calculation, most communication was verbal unaided by handouts or posted 
material.   
 
Program Outcomes: 
 
This section provides specifics on project performance and outcomes relative to the 
program’s three primary measures as well as a variety of other relevant considerations. 
As noted above, a spreadsheet detailing the milestones and final outcomes is provided on 
pages 43-44.  The identification and analysis of issues and the description of outcomes 
beyond the financials were informed through two separate (one mid-outage and another 
post-outage) on-site craft survey questionnaire, follow-up conversations that Cornell/ILR 
had with principals of the operator, contractor and union, as well as a series of on-site 
discussion groups with craft.   
 
Pay-Out 
  
Craft received a pre-tax per hour payout of $3.20. The final payout pool amounted to 
71.42% of the full pool.  The breakdown between measures was as follows: 
  
Schedule 41.92% 
Safety    7.5%  
Quality 22.0%  
TOTAL 71.42% 
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1.    Schedule 
 
The initial schedule target (front water wall replacement duration) was estimated at 22 
shifts.  However it was completed in 27 shifts, resulting in no payout on this first 
scheduled milepost.  Part of the over run was due to some problems beyond the control of 
the crafts.  Bad argon gas resulted in the loss of 2.5 shifts, craft had to stop to fabricate 
buck stay clips that were not provided, plus there were problems with the scaffolding that 
was under the control of a separate contractor that was not part of the gainsharing 
program.  The client and contractor bumped the gainsharing target up three shifts to 
adjust for these uncontrollable delays, but still the revised milepost was missed by 2 
shifts due to one individual who mistakenly cut through a number of water tube pipes.  
Tradesmen reported that failure to achieve any payout on this first schedule milepost hurt 
morale, but performance on the subsequent ten schedule mileposts improved to the point 
that the final payout was not dramatically short of what would have been 100% on-time 
performance. 
 
2.    Safety 
 
Four recordable accidents resulted in a safety payout of only 25% of the available safety 
pool, the lowest percentage performance of the three measures, and the subject of some 
controversy having to do with issues of a) controllability, b) undesired behavior, and c) 
appropriateness of measure.  Following are descriptions and discussion on each of these 
issues: 
 
A.   Controllability:  The tradesmen felt very strongly that they were punished (low 
percentage award) on the safety measure for outcomes over which they had either no 
control or only individual rather than group control. Three of the four recordables had 
to do with treatment for foreign objects in the eye.  Craft pointed out that the work 
environment is dirty and that there is particulate matter in the air which cannot be 
completely avoided, even when wearing all prescribed safety gear.   They also 
suggested that the company might consider washing down the area in advance of the 
outage, thereby removing some of the particulate matter prior to the tradesmen 
entering the work space. This is a practice that has been abandoned in recent years.  
This suggestion, or other possible systemic improvements, if implemented would 
suggest that addressing the issue of particulate matter in the air is within the influence 
of the workforce.   
 
 
B.   Undesired Behavior 
 
In post-outage discussions craft also indicated that the safety component of the 
gainsharing program resulted in people not reporting injuries, or going to the hospital 
on their own and paying for treatment out of their own pocket. This undesired 
behavior actually worked against their interests in one case in which a “particle in the 
eye” incident, that might have been immediately treated without triggering a 
“recordable,” was not reported in timely fashion by the employee until it became 
inflamed requiring a degree of treatment which ultimately resulted in a recordable.  
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An additional issue this circumstance identifies is that if incidents or accidents are not 
reported, the company loses its ability to accumulate quality data that might indicate 
trend lines giving advance warning of developing systemic problems – think airline 
near-miss reporting system. 
 
C.    Appropriateness of Measure 
 
The use of “OSHA recordable” as a measure of safety performance was the subject of 
some debate during post-outage debriefings. A reported accident becomes 
“recordable” when at least one of three consequences results: 1) a prescription is 
made, 2) the incident requires multiple physician visits, and/or 3) a puncture or 
injection is involved.  The possibility of developing  alternative measures for safety 
was discussed.  It was suggested that such measures could discern between minor 
incidents (e.g., particle in eye) and more significant accidents in which the human and 
financial impact were more serious.   An objection to this solution was voiced by the 
contractor and operator given that their interests relate to OSHA defined incidents.  
 
3.    Quality 
 
The crafts maxed out all three quality measures, the two pass/fail tests (hydro and 30-day 
uninterrupted run) as well as posting only 2.2% weld rejects (being less than 3% and 
meeting the 120% milestone payout). 
 
Tradesman Attraction / Retention   
 
The outage was adequately staffed.  The Boilermaker’s business manager credits this to 
aggressive recruiting at the hall.  The operator is unsure however as to whether the 
gainsharing program played a role in this.  They recognize that the program was new and 
unproven, and believe that the larger attraction might have been the volume and intensity 
(shifts of 7-10s and 7-12s) of the work.  A mid-outage survey completed by a significant 
percentage of the workforce indicated support for this conclusion in that 86% of 
respondents indicated that gainsharing had little or no impact on their decision to work 
this particular outage.   
 
This self-report data may be a bit suspect due to the fact that the culture of the crafts is 
clearly one which a tradesman sees himself as an independent minded professional who 
enters into an agreement to sell his high quality services at an established negotiated rate 
and thereby not one to be manipulated by management or corporate driven productivity 
schemes.  Nonetheless, in post-outage discussions the crafts reported significant interest 
in the daily reports of performance results and expressed concern about peer pressure not 
to report accidents.  In addition, they ultimately performed well above historical 
standards.  This may suggest that if indeed they were not initially attracted to the 
assignment because of gainsharing, they did become engaged by it once on-site.  Perhaps 
the true measure of success in this regard will be the degree of retention for the ’06 
outage. 
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Craft response to the survey question on attraction may also have been influenced by a 
widely held view that gainsharing was being offered as an alternative to sub pay and that 
the crafts would much rather just have the sub.  This view also worked to the 
disadvantage of the program in that the tradesmen considered sub pay theirs to be lost, as 
opposed to something additional to be won through improved performance.  Over time 
this perception may change but an alteration in the composition of the program 
description spreadsheet may help as well.  By placing the stretch target (120%) and 
largest reward to the left of the spreadsheet, then regressing with lesser performance to 
the right, the program administrators unconsciously reinforced the tradesmen notion that 
the highest award was their starting place and that anything less than that (even four 
levels of above-standard performance in the case of “safety”) amounted to degrees of 
failure.  Had the administrators reversed the linear order of targets and awards (0% at the 
far left, and 120% at the far right) this may have somewhat countered the sub pay history 
of bonus entitlement. 
 
As a final reflection on the impact of the gainsharing program on craft performance and 
interest in taking the job, the contractor pointed out that even if the survey response was 
accurate, in that 14% said that the presence of the gainsharing program did influence 
them somewhat or a lot in taking this job, this percentage could make all the difference in 
adequately manning a project. 
 
Attendance 
 
Attendance was not factored into the gainsharing program, either as a carrot (incentive) 
or a stick (disqualifier).  Foremen reported that it should have been tracked as an 
individual disqualifier, as the number of excused and unexcused absences was too high 
(at 3%) making work planning quite difficult.  This view was shared by both the 
contractor and business manager as well. 
 
Communication 
 
Most program description and progress communication was verbal, unaided by handouts or 
posted material.  This nearly sole reliance on verbal communication seems to have fallen short as 
tradesmen reported that the program was not well enough explained.  The underlying logic to the 
mid-term adjustment to the initial schedule target (22 shift adjusted to 25), and the decision not 
to adjust for the mistaken cutting of the boiler tubes, also seems not to have been well 
understood.  Additionally, due to late reporting of recordables, several versions of the final 
payout were circulated, each one less than the previous. 
 
Lessons and Future Plans 
 
In consideration of the Spring 2005 outage gainsharing program outcomes, what follows 
is a summary of insights that can, and in many cases are already planned to be, addressed 
by PPL/PMRI/Local 11 in their implementation of gainsharing programs for following 
years.  These lessons have been identified through a combination of assessment by the 
principal parties, suggestions or issues identified by craft on-site, and Cornell/ILR’s 
overall program evaluation efforts. Presented without intent of establishing any order of 
importance, these lessons and future plans are as follows:   
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1.    Employee Involvement:  The intensity and comparatively brief period of an outage does not 
lend itself well to forms of employee involvement that take employees off-line during work 
hours to engage in formal problem-solving.  Especially on critical path repair jobs, tradesmen hit 
the ground running and don’t let up until the outage is complete. For next year PPL/PMRI plan 
to engage outage foremen during the planning stages to identify possible work efficiencies and 
“work smarter” strategies beforehand.  The year-round safety core group will be working on the 
eye injury problem as well. 
 
2.    Program Communication Practices:  Providing written communication in addition to verbal 
reporting at job meetings will likely enhance craft understanding and thereby their ability and 
interest to fully engage in the program.   The operator and contractor are considering the 
distribution of written gainsharing orientation materials at next year’s job start-up to outline 
program specifics and the rationale/mechanics of gainsharing.  Also, there is consideration of 
displaying simple visual graphics at convenient job locations to convey progress to date on 
performance measures.  Finally, the intention is to provide craft with a letter of thanks for their 
participation in this year’s program and an assurance that management will consider suggestions 
for next year’s program made by craft in their post-outage surveys.  
 
3.   Safety Measure Issues:   Clearly the measurement of safety performance is complicated 
and requires further consideration.  Tradesmen viewed safety much more as a matter of 
individual responsibility and control rather than subject to group influence.  Within the 
gainsharing formula, individual mistakes/failings/errors impact productivity and quality, 
but generally not as dramatically as they do in relation to safety.  This is due to the 
substantial impact of each individual recordable. The client and contractor feel that it may 
be useful to modify the program next year to address both the group and individual 
components of safety.  Also under consideration will be making the measures less 
aggressive and defining formula increments that are not strictly linear. 
 
4.  Attendance:  Although there is no conclusive data to support the benefit of factoring 
attendance in as a measurement, the assumption is that it could be beneficial to do so. 
 
5.    Formula Development and Representation:  Greater attention is warranted on creating 
milestones in a manner that allows for more chance of “early wins” in order to avoid the 
deflated morale that came from not making the initial schedule milestones.  In addition, 
as outlined in the Program Outcomes section, further consideration could be given to 
representing milestones as cumulative gains as opposed to sequential losses. 
 
6. Broaden Union Involvement in Program Development:   Boilermakers constituted 40% of 
the outage workforce (with the next 30% constituted by electricians and pipefitters and 
the balance spread across seven other crafts).  As the majority craft, Boilermaker business 
manager Bob Hall was the sole union representative involved in program development.  
Other craft participated in the program based on the Boilermakers being happy with the 
arrangement and the fact that the General President’s Agreement was in effect.  Bob Hall 
was in contact with the other principal unions, however direct involvement of the other 
unions may have increased understanding and commitment to the final program, thereby 
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allowing a greater number of business managers to be informed advocates for the 
program in their communications with their craft. 
 
7. Establishing Confidence in Bid Figures and Measurement Milestones:  One of the challenges 
noted in the Handbook relates to how to establish craft confidence in the contractor’s bid 
figures and calculations as they relate to man hours, scope, and the establishment of 
milestones.  During program design neither the contractor nor the union saw this issue as 
a major concern given everyone’s familiarity with the plant and previous outage 
conditions.  Nonetheless, once the outage was underway, many craft on-site did express a 
concern that the schedule was too aggressive. Further consideration may be warranted on 
how milestones are established and/or how their determination is communicated to craft. 
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PPL/PMRI Colstrip Craft Incentive Program 
2005 Outage Gainsharing Plan Payout Metrics 
       
 
SAFETY 
30% of total pool 
              
Recordables 0 1 2 3 4 5
% of safety pool 120% 100% 75% 50% 25% 0%
% of total pool 36.0% 30.0% 22.5% 15.0% 7.5% 0.0%
         
  Opportunity 30% of total pool    
  Earned 7.5% of total pool    
         
              
       
 
SCHEDULE 
50% of total pool 
          
  % of boiler % of total 
Early 1 
shift 
On-
time 
Late 1 
Shift 
Late 2 
Shifts 
Boiler - 75% of schedule pool pool pool 120% 100% 50% 0% 
Front WW Replacement Duration 20% 7.5% 9.0% 7.5% 3.8% 0.0%
F.B.S. Removal Started 20% 7.5% 9.0% 7.5% 3.8% 0.0%
Rear Slope Replacement Duration 20% 7.5% 9.0% 7.5% 3.8% 0.0%
Boiler Watertight 20% 7.5% 9.0% 7.5% 3.8% 0.0%
Off Fireside C.O. 20% 7.5% 9.0% 7.5% 3.8% 0.0%
   37.5%      
         
  % of scr. % of total 
Early 1 
shift 
On-
time 
Late 1 
Shift 
Late 2 
Shifts 
Scrubbers 25% of schedule pool pool pool 120% 100% 50% 0% 
"A" Vessel Repairs Complete 16.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
"A" Vessel Scaffold Removed 16.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
"B" Vessel Repairs Complete 16.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
16.7%"B" Vessel Scaffold Removed 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
"C" Vessel Repairs Complete 16.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
"C" Vessel Scaffold Removed 16.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
 12.5%      
       
 Opportunity 50.00% % of total pool    
 Earned 41.9% % of total pool    
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QUALITY 
20% of total pool 
              
    Weld Reject Rate 
  % of quality % of total <3% 3-6% 6-9% >9% 
  pool pool 120% 100% 50% 0% 
Weld Quality 50% 10.0% 12.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0%
         
    Pass Fail    
Boiler Hydro Passed 30% 6.0% 6.0% 0.00%    
30 day run time w/no tube leaks 20% 4.0% 4.0% 0.00%    
         
  Opportunity 20.0% % of total pool    
  Earned 22.0% % of total pool    
              
       
 
TOTAL FINAL PAYOUT 
   Opportunity Earned    
 Safety 30.00% 7.50%    
 Schedule 50.00% 41.92%    
 Quality 20.00% 22.00%    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
   100.00% 71.42%    
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Texas Genco 
 
 
The Principals: Texas Genco (Owner) 
 Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., Inc. (Contractor) 
 Boilermaker Local #74, Pipefitter Local #211, Operator Local #450 
 
The Operation: 690 MWG B&W Radiant Boiler: Unit 5 at W.A. Parish Plant site 
 
The Outage: 100 crafts persons for 4 week outage  
 
Gainsharing Model Used:    Project Bid 
 
Project History and Circumstances 
 
Texas Genco is one of the largest wholesale electric power generating companies in the 
United States, with over 13,000 megawatts of generation capacity.  The company’s W.A. 
Parish plant is located near Houston, Texas, and has four coal-fired units. At this site 
Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., Inc. (BWCC) has frequently provided outage 
maintenance services.   Since the concept of performance based contracting had become 
the standard contracting method between Texas Genco and BWCC, extending the concept 
to include the Crafts in a gainsharing program was a logical extension of the company’s 
business practices.  
 
Aware of the gainsharing initiative of MOST by virtue of his involvement with the MOST 
Owners Advisory Committee, Don Powell, then Manager of Contractor Services for Texas 
Genco, now Manager of Purchasing, Logistics and Land Management, initiated 
discussions with the International Boilermakers (George Rogers, Ronnie Keck, and 
Herman Sullivan) and BWCC’s Ken Wasilewski.  The parties discussed the use of the 
gainsharing approach outlined in a previous version of this Gainsharing Handbook for an 
undetermined future outage project which would lend itself to a gainsharing approach. 
 
Shortly after these discussions, two identical projects were identified on adjacent identical 
boilers, to be performed in series with two months between the finish of the first project 
and the start of the second project. This appeared to be an ideal situation since the actual 
performance factors for the first project could serve as the target performance factors for 
the second project.  This circumstance would demonstrate to all parties that the targets 
were credible, i.e., realistic and achievable. During the first project all elements of actual 
cost versus estimated cost were tracked using the standard project management package 
(Primavera) used for all projects with Texas Genco.  The decision to apply gainsharing to 
this series of projects was not divulged during the first project in order to ensure that 
baseline performance was not influenced.  
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Description of the Gainsharing Program 
 
Establishing the Gainshare Pool 
 
Consistent with a “project bid” gainsharing model, the pool of gainshare dollars was 
established through actual project savings due to the job being completed in less work 
hours than the projected target.  The projected target was established using the baseline 
performance outcomes of the prior outage as explained above, including both direct and 
indirect work hours.  The differential between target hours and actual work hours 
established the work hours saved. The value of the avoided work hours established the 
gainshare pool. 
 
Performance Measures 
 
The gainsharing program was built upon both group and individual target performance 
expectations.  The group targets related directly to work hour and schedule milestones.   
 While encouraging favorable collective work hour performance, there were also individual 
performance factors (metrics) that defined successful project performance.  To encourage 
craftspersons to focus on these elements, personal eligibility metrics were developed in the 
areas of safety, absenteeism, and the avoidance of terminations and quits.  Work hour 
penalties which would reduce or eliminate the craftperson’s gainsharing payout would be 
the result of undesirable performance in these areas.  The primary individual performance 
measures/disqualifiers were established as follows: 
 
1. Safety 
 
In developing the program the safety metric received much discussion, especially on 
whether to make it a group or individual goal. The team settled on it being an individual 
metric for the following reasons. Should even one incident occur, due to the size of the 
project, the resultant incident rate would eliminate any gain from this aspect of the 
program for all of the participants. If this happened early in the project, the desired 
attention to safety could have been diminished. The team wanted all participants to have 
project long participation in the safety metric.  It has also been a Tripartite initiative to 
drive safety to the individual level to make each individual responsible for their own 
safety.  By making safety performance an individual metric, these goals were 
accomplished.  Each individual would be rewarded for their own safety record, and even 
those with incidents could suffer only partial forfeiture of participation in the program. 
  
2.     Absenteeism 
 
Work hour penalties tied to attendance were established to discourage absenteeism, late 
arrivals, and early quits. 
 
3.    Termination/Quits 
 
Similarly, work hour penalties tied to avoiding quits and terminations were established to 
encourage the craftspersons to stay to the end of the project and to preserve their accrued 
eligible work hours. 
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Establishing the Eligibility of Work Hours 
 
The three individual performance measures described above acted as disqualifiers for the 
establishment of the portion of the work hours saved that ultimately would be counted as 
the total gainshare eligible work hours.  Through protocol established by the gainshare 
program the amount of each individual craftperson’s eligible work hours was defined. By 
adding together all individual craftsperson eligible hours, the total eligible work hour 
amount was established.     
 
Establishing the Value per Craft Work Hour and Individual Pay-Out Amounts 
 
Once the total eligible work hour amount was defined, then the value per craft work hour 
was established by dividing the gainshare pool by the total eligible work hours. On a per 
eligible work hour basis everyone shared equally in the pool, regardless of craft or 
classification.  This meant that regardless of differentials in base pay between a 
boilermaker and an operator, both would be paid the same hourly amount for their 
gainsharing eligible hours.  The actual payout amounts were determined by multiplying the 
individual craftperson’s eligible work hours by the value per craft work hour.   
 
Challenges and Considerations in Developing the Gainsharing Program 
 
A variety of challenges and considerations arose throughout the development of the 
gainsharing program.  Some of the more prominent ones are discussed below: 
 
Building Buy-In to the Program:  It was recognized that all parties would need to “buy in” to 
the program. A series of meetings between Texas Genco, BWCC, and the Boilermakers as 
the primary craft were held to develop the program including overall targets and individual 
performance objectives. Once the program was developed the other crafts participated in a 
meeting to review the program and its development.   
 
Ensuring Understanding of Program Specifics:  From the outset it was vital that all 
craftspersons be aware of and understand the program, as well as believe that the targets 
were reasonable and achievable. A program summary was developed to be reviewed and 
distributed as part of the initial employment process. This document was given to each 
craftsperson and a sign-off was obtained verifying that each individual had read, 
understood, and was willing to participate in the program. 
 
Determining What to Measure:   In order to make the program easily understandable and 
credible it was desired to keep it as simple as possible.  This meant including as few targets 
and disqualifying components as practical while still encouraging the intended result. 
Tracking only the directly measured group and individual targets was judged to be the 
optimal approach. The team decided to make neither quality nor schedule a specifically 
measured  performance factor.  In the case of schedule it was anticipated that favorable 
performance in the other directly measured performance factors would result in no worse 
than schedule adherence, and more likely schedule improvement. In the case of quality, it 
was anticipated that the craftspersons would realize that the cost of rework (more work 
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hours) would directly diminish the gainshare payout and that this awareness would 
heighten individual and group sensitivity (peer pressure) to do the job right the first time.  
 
Minimizing Program Administration Effort:  It was determined that the administration of the 
gainsharing program should not create undue additional burden on the participants. BWCC 
expected that administering the program using its existing field office and project 
management information and tools would be efficient and avoid unnecessary additional 
effort.  
 
Communication Procedures:  It was agreed that communicating project progress and status in 
a timely and understandable manner was essential.  Large scale versions of some of the 
standard project management reports were displayed to communicate this information to 
the craftspersons.  Also, a quick response as to results and the actual gainsharing payout at 
project completion was important to couple the results with the expected payout. This was 
expected to be achievable due to the use of in place systems and contemporaneous input of 
data. 
 
Program Outcomes 
 
The 2005 program was very effective in achieving the desired results.  All areas of group 
and individual performance achieved significant improvement as measured against the 
baseline project. The targets selected were also successful in indirectly influencing other 
desired performance, as the craftspersons quickly understood the performance 
characteristics necessary to maximize their individual gainsharing payouts.  The average 
craftperson’s pre-tax  program payout was $2,350, with the highest individual payout 
being $5,770 and the lowest $123.  This equated to an hourly average payout of $12.80 
that was distributed to craftspersons within one week of project completion.  Per the 
program’s original intentions, the gainshare payout checks were distributed together with a 
thank you and congratulatory letter from Texas Genco and BWCC.  
 
Individual Performance 
 
The following section outlines the specific outcomes for the individual target milestones 
and provides how the gainshare project’s performance compared to that of the benchmark 
project on which gainsharing was not in effect.   Overall, approximately only 3% of the 
total work hours were forfeited due to undesirable performance.  
 
1. Safety:   Only one incident occurred. This is an improvement from the benchmark 
project in which there were two minor on-site first aid cases. 
 
2. Absenteeism:   Unexcused absenteeism was less than 0.5%.  This is a dramatic 
improvement from the 3% unexcused absences recorded for the benchmark project. 
 
3. Termination/Quits:  Two quits and four terminations were recorded during the outage 
project.   
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Following is an example of the spreadsheet used for tracking absenteeism and 
termination/quits, as well as for individual crafts person work hours.  
 
 
 
 
 
Group Performance   
 
As described previously, the overall group performance factors related to work hours were 
the basis upon which the total gainshare pool and eligible work hour values were 
established.  Although schedule and quality were not directed factored into the program as 
performance targets, these factors were tracked as well for sake of comparison with 
performance on the benchmark job. The following results and comparisons with the 
benchmark project were realized on the group performance factors: 
 
1. Productivity/Work hours:   A 24% reduction in direct and non-direct work hours was 
attained relative to the benchmark project. 
 
2. Schedule:  A 27% reduction in outage days (to hydro) was realized. 
 
3. Quality:  0% rework was required on the gainshare outage, in contrast to achieving less 
than 1% on the benchmark project.  
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Following are examples of graphs used for tracking and reporting on productivity and 
schedule: 
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Other Performance Results 
 
A variety of other factors considered as core business determinants in the future 
applicability of gainsharing for Texas Genco and BWCC were extrapolated from the 
overall results.  These indicators were cost savings and return on investment.  As the 
following charts show, there was significant benefit attained relative to each of these 
business measures. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
    
NET COST VERSUS ORIGINAL BUDGET
COST SAVINGS
EARLY COMPLETION
VALUE
NET PROJECT COST
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
GAINSHARE
INVESTMENT
GAINSHARE RETURN
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Lessons and Future Plans 
 
Feedback on the overall success of the 2005 gainsharing program from all involved parties 
was very positive. A lesson’s learned session with Texas Genco, BWCC, and the Crafts 
represented resulted in the need for no structural changes to the program.  All parties are 
looking forward to the next opportunity to implement gainsharing.  Due to the success of 
the program, a variety of insights and lessons were gained that warrant mention here.  
These are as follows: 
 
1. Building Buy-In: The development and pre-project meetings worked very successfully to 
create a program that was credible and had “buy-in” from all the participants at the 
Owner/Craft/Contractor management level.  
 
2. Ensuring Understanding of the Program: The summary used to explain the program at the 
hire-in process was effective in communicating the program to each craftsperson. 
Asking for a sign-off from each craftsperson raised the level of comprehension of the 
program.  
 
3. Program Administration:  Program administration was kept simple, without a lot of rules 
or regulations imposed.  Tracking of attendance and safety was done with existing 
systems using common excel spreadsheets.  This approach minimized any additional 
administrative burden. 
 
4. Performance Tracking and Communication: Using the standard project management 
software (Primavera) facilitated BWCC’s ability to track milestone progress and post 
semi-weekly graphic print-outs of actual versus target productivity and earned value.  
Having this information readily available and easily understandable positively 
impacted craft motivation and understanding of progress. 
 
5. Employee Involvement: No formal structured craftspersons involvement program, or 
suggestion program was implemented for this project. Observations during the project 
indicated ad hoc occurrences of “brainstorming” and inter-craft cooperation and 
planning in response to specific situations. For a project of this size, it was felt that 
such informal means are not only desirable, but more cost, schedule, and 
administratively successful than other approaches. Larger and longer projects may 
benefit from a more formal approach to crafts person feedback.  
 
6. Gainshare Pay-Out Letter: Dispersing the gainsharing check the week following project 
completion with a letter of thanks signed jointly by Texas Genco and BWCC was 
considered an important component of the overall program.  As such, this approach 
satisfied the goals of providing immediate feedback and reward and the continuation 
improving performance and relationships.  The concluding letter below is an example 
of the letter sent to all participating craftspersons. 
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          CONGRATULATIONS 
 
The recently completed burner relocation project at Texas Genco’s W A Parish Unit #5 was 
a huge success.  Based upon the efforts of the entire team, especially the craftspersons, the 
project was completed safely, in conformance with all quality requirements, ahead of 
schedule, and under budget. 
 
The Gainsharing Program developed and implemented for this project created a true 
Tripartite project approach with Texas Genco, Craft Labor, and BWCC working together 
cooperatively to execute the project and to share in the benefits of exceeding project target 
goals and expectations in the areas of SAFETY, QUALITY, AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
 
Your individual performance and the collective performance of the entire craft team have 
resulted in significant project savings and operational benefits. Based upon these savings a 
Gainshare pool has been calculated per the program rules which you received and reviewed 
when you joined the project team.  The Gainshare pool is being distributed to each 
participating craftsperson in accordance with these rules. 
 
Your share of the Gainshare pool is included. 
 
Thank you for your efforts and contribution to the success of this project.  We are looking 
forward to future projects and successes. 
 
        
TOGETHER WE MAKE IT HAPPEN 
 
 
Don Powell   Ken Wasilewski 
Manager, Contractor Services Regional Construction Manager 
Texas Genco   Babcock and Wilcox Construction Co., Inc. 
 
 
February 21, 2005 
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ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE… Case Study   
he Principals:  Entergy (owner) 
(contractor) 
95 Electricians, Local 36-L 
79 
ncil 
The Operation:  0 megawatt nuclear plant unit 
he Outage:  600-800 trades for 2003 outage (145,000 man hours) 
ainsharing Model Used:    Project Goal 
roject History and Circumstances 
ately 30,000 megawatts of 
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re 
ue to his previous position as Business Manager with the Boilermakers Local 69 in the 
 
rate 
t, 
es 
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es and 
escription of the Gainsharing Program 
ponents of ANO’s 
incentive plan. 
 
 
 
T
   Stone & Webster 
Local 69 Boilermakers, Local 2
Sheetmetal Workers, Local 624 Operating Engineers, Local 
Elevator Constructors, Local 10 Asbestos Workers, District Cou
80 Painters (unions) 
  
80
 
T
 
G
 
P
 
ntergy owns and operates power plants with approximE
combined electric generating capacity from fossil, nuclear, and renewable sources. 
company’s Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) plant is located in Russellville, Arkansas, whe
two nuclear units produce approximately 1700 megawatts.  Incentive programs with craft 
participation have been in effect at this plant since 1996.  Although the gainsharing 
programs have been developed entirely independent of the Tripartite effort represented by 
this Gainsharing Handbook, this case study is included because of the depth of experience 
and potential represented by such a well established program. 
 
D
area, Dale Branscum of the Boilermakers International made contact with Stone & 
Webster’s site manager, Harold McQueen, and arranged for Cornell researchers and
himself to meet with representatives of the contractor and the involved locals.  A sepa
meeting occurred with each of the two groups in January of 2005 with the purpose of 
learning specifically how their craft incentive plan operates, what it takes to maintain i
and the general attitudes and insights of craft on the benefits of the plan.  Separate 
summaries of these exchanges are represented in this case study’s Program Outcom
section.  Although much of the information reported is similar, both accounts are inclu
to illustrate the different focus and perspectives of the two groups.  In addition, the 
Description of the Gainsharing Program section that follows provides a variety of 
information as presented to on-site craft to describe the specific measures, mileston
operating principles of ANO’s gainsharing/incentive program.  
 
 
D
 
he following charts are used by Stone & Webster to describe the comT
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Arkansas Nuclear One 
Entergy/Stone & Webster/Building Trades 
 
1. SAFETY  
. SECURITY  
. 
2
CE 
S/RETURNING CRAFT 
 
1
1  10% Increase in Gross       
Earnings 
 
Incentive Plan 
30%
5%2
3. A.L.A.R.A 10%  
4. QUALITY 0%  
5. ATTENDAN 10%  
6. REFERRAL 5%  
7. HOUSEKEEPING 10%  
8. PRODUCTIVITY 0%  
  00% =
 
. INCENTIVE GOES INTO EFFECT APRIL 12, 2004, AND W  
 
. PAID WITHIN TWO WEEKS AFTER OUTAGE COMPLETION. 
MAIN ELIGIBLE FOR 
INCENTIVE PROGRAM. 
. SAFETY - Zero lost time accidents and zero recordable accidents. 
2. .R. per 50,000 man-hours. 
R’s written by Stone & Webster craft will not be 
counted against this incentive.  Human performance CR’s involving WRONG TRAIN/WRONG 
l 
 
. REFERRALS/RETURNING CRAFT - Entergy nuclear system experienced craft to be greater than 75% of 
 
. HOUSEKEEPING – Improve housekeeping in work areas with less than 10 deficient areas for outage.  Note:  
 Sheets and brought to the attention of all craft. 
8. PRODUCTIVITY - Meeting daily schedules including breaker to breaker outage schedule. 
 
A ILL END MAY 16, 2004. 
B
 
C. GOALS EVALUATED PRIOR TO OUTAGE. 
 
D. CRAFT MUST BE RELEASED FROM PROJECT BY R.I.F. TO RE
 
1
 
SECURITY - Less than 1 S.I
 
3. A.L.A.R.A. - Meet department Man Rem and P.C.E. goals. 
 
4. QUALITY - Less than 5 C.R.’s.  NOTE: Self identified C
COMPONENT WILL ZERO OUT THIS CATEGORY. 
 
5. ATTENDANCE - 1% unapproved absences.  Craft to remain on site until R.I.F. is issued.  Emergencies wil
be handled on a case by case basis. 
6
all craft on site, with less than 10% of no shows per date. 
7
Areas will be walked down weekly by Craft Leads, Modification Engineers, or Modification Supervisors.  
Deficient areas will be noted on Housekeeping Walkdown
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INCENTIVE SCORE SHEET 
 
SAFETY 
30% 
     
    
    ‘0’ Lost time, 
‘0’ Recordables 
 
S CUR
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
   
E ITY 
  
<5 S.I.R.  per 50,000 
man-hours 
<4 S.I.R.  per 50,000 
man-hours 
<2 S.I.R.  per 50,000 
man-hours 
<1 S.I.R.  per 50,000 
man-hours 
<3 S.I.R.  per 50,000 
man-hours 
 
A.L.A.R.A. 
2% 4% 
 
6% 
 
8% 
 
10% 
  
4% over Dept. Man Rem 
and P.C.E. goals 
3% over Dept. Man Rem 
and P.C.E. goals 
 1% over Dept. Man Rem 
and P.C.E. goals 
Meet Dept.  Man Rem 
and P.C.E. goals 
2% over Dept. Man Rem
and P.C.E. goals 
 
QUALITY 
4% 8% 
 
10% 
 
15% 
 
20% 
  
CR’s, 15 or Less CR’s, 13 or Less  CR’s, 9 or Less CR’s, 7 or Less CR’s, 11 or Less
 
NOTE:  S tified CR’s written by Webster c ed against this ince
ATTENDANCE 
 
 
elf iden  Stone & raft will n tot be coun
 
ntive. 
2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
    
5% unapproved absences* 4% unapproved absences* 2% unapproved absences* 1% unapproved absences*3% unapproved absences*
*NOTE:  Craft to remain on site until R.I.F. is issued n a case by case basis. 
 
REFERRAL DATES/RETURNING CRAFT 
 
.  Emergencies will be handled o
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
    
67% Return* 
With 18% no shows. 
75% Return* 
With 10% no shows. 
69% Return* 
With 16% no shows. 
71% Return* 
With 14% no shows. 
73% Return* 
With 12% no shows. 
*NOTE:  of Enter
 
HOUSEKEEPING 
  
Percent gy experienced craft in site total. 
2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 
   
30 – Deficient work areas. 25 – Deficient work areas. 15 – Deficient work areas. 10 – Deficient work areas.20 – Deficient work areas.
 
PRODUCTIVITY 
     
2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 
5% over schedule 4% over schedule  2% over schedule Meet daily or outage 
schedule. 
3% over hedule sc
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Incentive Program Principles  
g infor d to or e prin cipatio
 
 
 
 
 
The followin mation is use ient craft to th ciples of parti n in 
ANO’s incentive program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Craft Incentive Program and  
what YOU can do to make it a success at ANO 
 
? Participate in
? ervisor. 
 
e Program team. 
igh expectations. 
 making the Incentive work 
Bring your suggestions for a better job forward to your Foreman or Sup
? Encourage others to support the Incentiv
? Everyone is important on this job. 
 
? Attitude is everything/be pro-active. 
en to communication. ? Keep a positive attitude and be op
 Keep coworkers focused on ANO’s?  h
 
? Teamwork is the key to our success. 
 e? fforts.  We are all in this  All crafts are interdependent on each others productive
effort together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entergy/Stone & Webster/Building Trades 
Site Administration 
 
? A Joint nion, Stone 
& Webster, and Enterg  every two weeks to 
review strategies and progress on the Incentive Plan. 
? t 
gram on track.  The 
JLMC will track performance and will be responsible for communicating the 
 
Labor / Management Committee (JLMC), comprised of U
y representatives will meet
 
The JLMC will receive input from craft workers on valid suggestions tha
could improve performance and keep the incentive pro
status of the incentive goals to the craft workers. 
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Program Outcomes 
tone and Webster On-Site Meeting 
een in existence for nine years for three of four nuclear plants 
exception is the Waterford facility (near New Orleans) for which 
 building trades, and no need to provide an incentive plan.  
ent and retention.  The General President’s 
at 
 
om 
d 
d with 
r a week during the outage 
bulating the results.  The results are posted regularly during the outage.  The emphasis on 
e 
 the 
e original Stone and Webster contract included a 90% of market 
e plan allowing for 0 to 12% addition to gross pay for all time worked 
 
 
r a 
 
ought it could be paid at more 
equent intervals, rather than at completion of the outage.  The business managers also 
o 
600 
 
S
 
The incentive plan has b
wned by Entergy.  The o
there is adequate coverage by the
he incentive program is designed for recruitmT
agreement covers the maintenance at ANO, and 7 of 13 trades now make more under th
agreement than their contracts on the open market.  Outages typically involve 160 to 190K
craft hours.  The incentive plan has been altered over the years to reflect changing 
priorities of the owner and contractor and needed improvements.  The most significant 
change has been to weigh safety as a higher percentage of the possible bonus.  This has 
been done by increasing the percentage of the incentive plan that is tied to safety, and 
reducing the percentage of the bonus tied to other factors. The payout has ranged fr
6.3% to 10% gross bonus; with an average payout of around 8.5% (they have never 
actually calculated an average).  The plan is reviewed each year following the outage, an
that has led to changes in weighting for the next outage.   
 
Stone and Webster estimates that there are three or four meetings each year associate
the plan. These include two or three before the outage and one review meeting after the 
outage.  In addition, Harold McQueen spends about an hou
ta
safety has yielded dramatic improvements, including cross-craft responsibility for safety.  
There is a high level of peer pressure during the outage to perform to the standards.  Ston
and Webster’s profits are a markup on craft and non-manual labor costs.  Entergy pays
entire cost of the incentive plan, which has ranged from $150,000 to $300,000 per outage.   
 
On-Site Craft Meeting  
 
The Arkansas Nuclear One program originally started when Stone & Webster replaced 
echtel as the maintenance contractor at this plant and three other nuclear sites (all B
Entergy) in 1996.  Th
age and an incentivw
at ANO.  As the contract improved over time (half of the trades now make more at ANO
than they do in the general market) the incentive was changed to only be used during
outage time (about once a year).  At that time, the incentive plan was altered to allow fo
0 to 10% gross bonus for time worked during the period leading up to the outage and 
during the outage until an individual worker is laid off.   
 
In general, the business managers were well informed about the specifics of the plan, and 
had little to criticize about it.  They thought both their members and the travelers were
satisfied with the plan, although the business managers th
fr
thought that the plan significantly improved attendance, and that the trades all responded t
the plan.  They reported a normal craft workforce of around 100 at ANO, increasing to 
to 800 craftsmen during the outage.   
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Issues and Lessons 
 
1. Cross-Craft Cooperation:  Boilermakers and electricians are the primary crafts on the job, 
with the electricians being the principle craft representative when the plant is operating.  
orkers, etc are also included.  This diversity of representation 
necessitates greater cross-craft cooperation in attaining goals. 
2. 
 
 the plan each time it is 
used, but the principal negotiation takes place between Entergy and Stone and Webster.  
3.  
the 
 owner, contractor, trade leadership, and craftsmen.   
 
 
 
 
Pipefitters, asbestos w
 
Gainsharing Program and Collective Bargaining:  It is not clear whether the establishment of 
the plan and the reward structure can actually qualify as a negotiation.  The President
of the Arkansas Building and Construction Trades signs off on
  
Long-Term Benefits:  An incentive program can be regularly (year-round and multi-year)
used to address long-term issues and to alter the behavior of all the participants to 
benefit each of them. 
 
4. Creating Continuous Improvement:  Incentive plans can create learning systems in which 
continuous improvement becomes the norm.  A critical component of this factor is 
stability of the parties;
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Additional Overall Lessons from Pilots/Case Studies 
 addition to the specific lessons cited in connection to each case profile, overall 
ssessment shows a variety of broader insights and lessons. These are explained below 
e.  
long-
 
n lack confidence in 
their potential for adequate profit margins to share with craft.  If the terms of an outage 
 
ing out 
n 
already over-busy schedules.   Proper planning requires pre-emptive commitment on 
 
 
2.  
t 
e when commenced prior to the start of 
work.   Although new construction and large project work may offer different 
e to 
g. 
 
 union 
 
, 
ven that the primary impact of such 
suggestions either has limited immediate financial impact or can only be implemented 
 
 should be 
 
In
a
without intending to establish any particular order of importanc
 
1. Implementing a gainsharing program for short-term outage work requires a 
term business perspective.  The last-minute “lock-in” on scope and dates for outage
work creates an atmosphere whereby owners and contractors ca
gainsharing/incentive plan are not known adequately in advance, local union 
representatives are unable to promote the plan as part of that job’s pay package and 
consequently can not use the plan as incentive to attract “traveler” craft.    
In addition, attending to the many details (understanding profit potential, work
the formula, getting buy-in from trades, etc.) of a well-conceived gainsharing plan ca
take several months, especially since these tasks seem to fall to project managers with 
the part of the owner and contractor.  When such commitment is integral to a long-term
business strategy, planning aspects can be anticipated and cost-benefit analyses 
conducted with a multi-year perspective.  .   
The primary decisions and strategies that impact work efficiency must be made 
during the job planning stage, therefore employee involvement efforts aimed a
improving performance will be most effectiv
opportunities, the short-term intensity of outage work does not allow adequate tim
develop or engage in significant employee involvement efforts once the job is goin
Pre-job employee involvement related to identifying inefficiencies and problem solving
can be arranged by working with year-round maintenance employees and local
representatives instead of the outage workforce force.  In addition, mid or post-job 
surveys from a previous year’s outage can serve to identify issues and solutions to be 
factored into a current year’s program.   
One of the more common formalized means of employee involvement in other 
industries is a suggestion system whereby craft can provide insights on work sequence
allocation of resources, etc.  However, gi
through planning for future outages, the contractor’s incentive for investing 
significantly in formalized suggestion systems appears to be low.  Nonetheless, those 
sites that openly encourage informal suggestion sharing through stewards and
supervisors do seem to get valuable in-stream ideas. Further experience is required to 
fully understand how to involve craft on-site and what specific types of input
solicited. 
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3.  
 program development may increase their understanding of the program 
and thereby their interest and ability in advocating its benefits to their craft.  As one 
ant 
 
4. ge 
 of other craft as principal partners in gainsharing 
programs may be beneficial to success.   In those cases supported and researched for 
 
ately 
 
5. 
l measures so that craft have incentive and control in both categories.   
Given that one of the primary motivating factors for gainsharing is greater earnings, 
 habits 
ft 
 
6.   re 
l.  Given that many of 
the success factors for gainsharing point to integration with broader good business and 
 
 
d 
ilt-in protection when craft gain is directly tied to schedule, 
that in turn is tied to reduced costs to the owner and contractor.  Goal Model projects 
s 
 Greater involvement of local union business managers and/or agents in upfront 
gainshare
of the craft’s primary connections at hire-in, local BMs and BAs can have a signific
influence on their craft workforce’s receptivity to a gainsharing program.  If these 
union representatives are well informed about why and how milestones and targets 
have been developed, as well as being thoroughly versed in gainsharing principles and 
the mechanics of the program, they are more able to get their craft engaged in the 
potentials of gainsharing.   
Although Boilermakers are often the critical path craft involved in industry outa
and project work, inclusion
this Handbook, participation of craft other than boilermakers primarily occurred based
on assurances of acceptability to the Boilermaker representatives.  Although ultim
not significantly problematic for pilot sites, in some situations there may exist a 
potential for greater cross-craft cooperation relative to acceptance of the program and 
work performance if more than one union is taking responsibility for the program’s 
success. 
Gainshare formulas should be developed in manners that balance group and 
individua
craft must see potential for appreciable gain to be encouraged to alter their work
and behaviors.   Having too much of that potential tied to group (the entire cross-cra
on-site workforce) dependent measures such as schedule and quality, or safety, may 
discourage individuals from believing they can realize any substantial gains.  Providing 
some measures (i.e., attendance, return referral, or some aspect of safety) as 
individually dependent measures may allow craftsmen a greater sense of outcome 
control and thereby more incentive to improve performance.  
Designing gainsharing programs to be sustainable over multiple years may requi
that no one party has gain without the others doing so as wel
labor management practices, all parties should benefit from program implementation.  
In other words, a gainsharing program that allows an owner or contractor to make 
significant gains without sharing those with the union is going to leave craft 
disgruntled and unmotivated for the future.  Likewise, a plan that puts significant gain 
in the pockets of craft but does not also benefit owners or contractors will not be 
repeated in future years.  
Ensuring equitability relates to how the distribution formula is established.  On Bi
Model projects there is bu
don’t necessarily have the same built-in equity.  It is possible to construct a formula 
that would pay craft well for safety, attendance, and quality even when schedule target
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are not met.  This could leave the owner and/or contractor at a loss, since generally 
their most immediate gain is through beating schedule.  Conversely, if schedule targe
are significantly beat but the lion share of potential gain for craft is in safety, 
attendance, and quality where performance has not met targets, then it possible that a 
disproportionate amount of the realized gain goes to the owner and/or contractor. 
posed Criteria for Successful Gainsharing Implementation 
ts 
 
 
Pro
ased on the experience of the pilots, case studies, and lessons from related industries, the 
kelihood of 
uccessful gainsharing development and implementation.   Although every situation is 
 
it 
1. Pre-existing relationships with some degree of trust between owner, contractor and 
2. Interest, incentive, and willingness to improve relationships  
ents 
tice 
6.  for pre-planning and program design  
l exists 
s 
ation session and materials 
vements 
15.  with craft thoroughly explaining outcomes  
 
 
 
 
B
following list of criteria represents those factors that increase the overall li
s
unique, and having all the criteria in place in any one situation is unlikely, these factors can
serve either as goals, or indicators to strive for, in ensuring that gainsharing is a likely f
and successfully implemented in your circumstances.  
 
Success Criteria 
 
union 
3. Previous successful experience with incentive programs and/or extra-contractual 
arrangem
4. Gainsharing seen as integral to sustainable good business prac
5. Market conditions that allow for adequate profit margins to be shared 
Sufficient time
7. Mutual consent among participating parties on where gain potentia
8. Willingness by all parties to take some risk relative to potential earning
9. Development and provision of thorough pre-job orient
10. Solicitation and utilization of craft suggestions on work performance impro
early in the planning and/or outage schedule 
11. Performance measures based on elements that craft have control over 
12. Union involvement in target development and adoption of an assertive role in 
representing the program to craft 
13. Capacity for thorough on-site performance progress reporting 
14. Program mechanisms for adjusting to mid-job scope changes  
 Post-job follow-up communication
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